Japan’s Search for Meaning

EUNICE KIM

One of the most destabilising factors to regional peace is the preeminent rise of one country. When the balance of power breaks down, there is an increased risk of conflict. This is the reality confronting East Asia with the ascent of China. In regaining the balance, the strength of the network of other Asian countries is important – and Japan may be a significant player in constructing and strengthening these ties. Perhaps it is the case that Japan has been startled by the precipitous rise of China and its emerging presence in East Asia. Many analysts talk of Japan becoming increasingly isolated in the region with historical revisionism and disillusionment of the Japanese people with a plateauing economy. However, Japan is still an economic powerhouse and through nurturing its alliances in East and South East Asia it will be able to provide effective checks against the emerging Chinese threat.

Japan was once deemed as the ‘land of the rising sun’, being one of the first countries in East Asia to open borders and trade with the Westerners in the 19th century. Even after its defeat in the Second World War, the country remained internationally competitive in the electronics and motor industries and has maintained its place as the world’s second largest economy since 1968 until 2010, overtaken only by China. In fact, the last few decades have posed many challenges for Japan, not least the ‘Lost Decade’ where low inflation, stagnant economic growth and a weak employment rate – following an asset price bubble puncture – crippled the Japanese economy. Moreover, the country confronts chronic problems such as a rapidly ageing population and relative decline in political influence in the Asia Pacific region. Some have used metaphors such as the popular cartoon series, Attack on Titan, where the protagonists enlist in the military to fight against Titans invading their town. The looming presence of Titans was understood as capturing Japan’s perception of mainland China and military involvement seemed to signal Japan’s militaristic message against the threat. However, such a depiction of Japan may be too simplistic and its recent military posturing is less effective compared to its more interesting economic and political strategy to build a diverse alliance.

Japan’s economy is finally growing – albeit by a modest amount – after the implementation of Abenomics policies, characterised by fiscal stimulus, monetary easing and structural reforms. The country’s GDP per capita is still greater than that of China and it is forming new ties with other economic partners in South East Asia. Japan has consistently engaged with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), increasing its investment over the last decade. Many Japanese businesses are thinking twice about investing in China due to anti-Japanese sentiments and rising wages. South East Asia, on the other hand, offers relatively lower wages and Japanese firms are increasing their presence in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand as a result of a squeeze in the domestic market.

However, Japan is not just seeking economic ties but also diplomatic alliances. Since Shinzo Abe was elected as the Prime Minister, a number of his ministers have visited South East Asian countries to cement relatively good ties and to cooperate on naval training and even sales of military equipment. Through diversifying its partnership with other democratic countries, Japan plans to cooperate on maritime security, military preparedness and securing human rights. This outreach has been an ongoing project for over a decade.  More recently, Japan has cancelled Myanmar’s $1.8 billion of debt and promised $500m in aid loans; Mr Abe also visited the country’s President Thein Sein as well as the opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, promising support for major reforms to the former British colony.

Moreover, the country is the key provider of security assistance for many ASEAN countries, including the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Despite tensions between Tokyo and Seoul over historical issues, the Japanese and South Korean armed forces continue to pursue quiet security cooperation. Considering China’s long-seated territorial disputes with many ASEAN members, including Vietnam, the alliance between Japan and ASEAN could potentially develop as a check against China’s dominance in the region.

However, Japan’s foreign policy is grounded in its domestic politics. Mr Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) enjoyed a rare majority support for the coalition government in two successive elections in 2012 and 2014. As a result, the Japanese domestic politics has experienced a strong right-ward shift. Recent statements and public comportment of the Prime Minister has led to the indignation of many neighbouring countries. His visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on several occasions to respect the war dead, including several notorious war criminals, was met with disapproval in South Korea and China. More serious is the party’s move to amend the country’s pacifist constitution that would rule out military aggression to settle international disputes, a policy deemed counterproductive in terms of forming democratic alliance with other Asian nations.

Shinzo Abe visits the controversial Yasukuni Shrine 

One can speculate as to the cause of such a veer towards nationalist right-wing tendencies. Many of Abe’s cabinet members are also members of the Nippon Kaigi or “Japan Conference,” a nationalistic right-wing group whose members believe that Japan should be applauded for liberating much of East Asia from Western colonial powers; that the 1946-1948 Tokyo War Crimes tribunals were illegitimate; and that the killings by Imperial Japanese troops during the 1937 ‘Nanjing massacre’ were exaggerated or fabricated. Some commentators have compared the Nippon Kaigi to the Tea Party in the United States; both movements which claim to represent grassroots and traditional values but are products of deep conservative anxieties about the future.

Yet, these groups are growing in influence and they recognise Japan as an international power matching both that of the US and China. Hence, Japan has increased its military expenditure to become more independent from the American defense umbrella and engaged in territorial disputes with China regarding the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, and with its more adjacent neighbour South Korea over sovereignty of the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. This is not to say that a more militarist Japan would necessarily be followed by more hostile Sino-Japanese relations. In fact, both nations are well aware the high costs entailed in engaging in warfare; the two nations’ ties may indeed be closer than media depicts them to be. Having an unfriendly neighbour is mutually beneficial for the politicians of these two countries as their populations can vent anger outwardly against such a perceived threat, rather than inwardly to the government. Thus, as long as the two countries are careful not to escalate the tension, the likelihood of military conflict in East Asia may be low. Nonetheless, Japan’s increasingly belligerent attitudes have left many countries suspicious of its motive and acts as a hindrance to constructing stronger international ties.

Japan is a country searching for meaning: reverting back to its imperial past and military doctrine is not the answer. Instead, it should look towards the future of the multi-polar world where the cooperation of smaller countries can go a long way to provide checks on larger powers. Therefore, continuing its project to diversify its alliances in East Asia, the Asia-Pacific and Southeast Asia will be more fruitful in allowing Japan to find its new place as an indispensable player in international cooperation. It goes without saying that Japan’s role in maintaining the American alliance and healthy relations with other Asian countries is crucial in maintaining the balance of power the region sorely needs.

A Gulf Apart? Regional co-operation in the Middle East

DANIEL DE LISLE

The Gulf Cooperation Council 2014

The Gulf Co-operation Council’s Arabic language website is proud of its graphs. Population and GDP, both slowly annexing the white space above them. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates’ statistics have certainly been impressive enough over the last 30 years on their own. The U.A.E. is believed to hold $900 billion in its various sovereign wealth funds, and the three major Gulf airlines, Emirates, Qatar Airways and Etihad, together placed orders for £100 billion worth of aircraft at the 2013 Dubai Airshow. There’s a hint to the GCC’s future in the way the Council’s name is shortened in Arabic in the graphs – ‘States of the council of co-operation’ – no mention of ‘Arab’, or the Gulf. With such concerns around identity, we are prompted to ask: what is the G.C.C., and what are the threats facing it?

The G.C.C. started life as a strategic military union but, like other notable regional co-operation blocs, its functions and mission have expanded in scope over time. There are three projects which give us an idea of what the GCC is, and what it is not, yet. The first is the Gulf Railway – this is planned to link all current member-states by 2018, offering more options for trade within the region than by road and air, at an initially estimated cost of $19 billion. It has gone smoothly so far – perhaps because the division of costs is in proportion to the length of track in each country, meaning Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. are the main funders, and it provides something for everyone. It gives the airport hubs of the region, Dubai, Doha and Abu Dhabi, easy access to the huge domestic market of Saudi Arabia, the largest Arab economy, allowing them to maintain and expand their status as trade hubs. The project will create 50,000 jobs, which is particularly important for Saudi Arabia, who feel they need to place their youth in gainful employment. Paid for by those with deep pockets, and benefitting all – Gulf co-operation at its best.

The GCC’s combined military, the Peninsula Shield Force, has had a rather more mixed history. It enjoys support from all member states, possibly in part because it is relatively small, at around 7,000 men. This pales in comparison with the Saudi Arabian Army, at 150,000 men, and it is difficult to see precisely what significant foreign threat the Force would be sufficient to repel. Even in the smaller Gulf states, the Force tends not to be a cornerstone of defence policy, with Bahrain hosting the U.S. Fifth Fleet, and, in the coming years, a U.K. Naval base, to guarantee its otherwise precarious international security position. Bahrain, however, was the setting for the most controversial use of the Shield Force. On 14th March 2011, during extensive anti-government protests in Bahrain as part of the Arab Spring, troops from the Peninsula Shield Force entered Bahrain via the causeway from Saudi Arabia, at the request of the Bahraini government. Allegations were immediately levelled that Bahrain was using the GCC to protect the monarchy from their own subjects, but the commander of the Force stated in late March that their role was to ‘secure vital and strategically important military infrastructure from any foreign interference’, while Bahrain security forces are ‘preoccupied with internal security’ - A distinction that, to its critics, will be one without a difference.

Other projects have stalled. The proposed Gulf Monetary Union, designed to produce a single currency akin to the Euro, the Khaleeji, has faced serious difficulties. First proposed in 2000, it made a lot of sense on paper. The GCC economies were virtually in currency union already, as they were all pegged to the US dollar. They had, and have, low interest and inflation rates, huge foreign exchange reserves (in excess of $1 trillion), government budget surpluses and low government debt. The scheme fell afoul of politics, however, as the U.A.E. announced its withdrawal in 2009, in protest at the decision to locate the proposed central bank of the currency in Riyadh. The tension between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh has the potential to scupper future projects, as the Emiratis appear to be concerned that the GCC is being used simply to further Saudi political and economic hegemony in the region.

Going forward, one of the main tensions in the Council is likely to be that between the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia economically, as the former diversifies while the latter does not, and Qatar and the others politically. Qatar’s regional political priorities, particularly since the Arab Spring, have broken with the rest of the GCC. Qatar was a major backer of Mohammed Morsi during his brief administration in Egypt, and its state news outlet, al-Jazeera, has recently crossed swords with the regime of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. This is in contrast to the policy of Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., which have financially supported Sisi, and who consider the Muslim Brotherhood’s democratic methods and revolutionary Islamism anathema to their own doctrines. There are also more long-term threats to the co-operation of the member states. Recent falling oil prices have left Oman harder hit than fellow member-states. The oil slump is likely to be short-term, but Oman’s oil is comparatively expensive to produce and ,perhaps more importantly, is running out. In December, through official newspapers the Omani government encouraged their people to save (government-subsidised) water and energy, and warned that Oman may even have to introduce an income tax. The ways in which member states deal with the decline of their oil reserves, and diversify into other industries, may well produce tensions within the bloc, as their economies grow less similar and their economic priorities diverge. This is already visible in the relative success of the U.A.E’s diversification as compares to the other gulf economies. With Oman’s monarch currently thought to be gravely ill and Saudi Arabia’s king recently deceased, dynastic uncertainty is another factor which could threaten the GCC in the future. Its political basis is the shared reactionary politics of the major Arab monarchies – were one or more of the member states to face a revolution such that it was no longer a reactionary monarchy, secession from  the GCC would almost certainly result. The question of precisely who the Peninsula Shield Force is protecting, monarchs or people, may well be asked again. 

THE UN IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD: AN OPEN OR CLOSED SHOP?

Kameel Premhid

@kameelpremhid

The UN Security Council

According to Kofi Anan, its former Secretary-General, the United Nations (UN) is founded on the ‘principle of equality’ – between people and nations. But, as I argue in this essay, the UN’s history proves quite the opposite – it legitimates the power and domination of the many by the few. As I suggest, it does so in two ways: on the one hand, it has not fundamentally changed the conduct and character of international relations and law; whereas, on the other, its very structure makes the equitable re-distribution of power impossible. To illustrate this, I examine the international system prior and subsequent to its founding. I argue that, despite the potential for change, the underlying self-interest of states – especially the UN’s permanent 5 members (P5) – makes a truly equitable UN in a multipolar world impossible.

The period immediately prior to the UN’s establishment in 1945 proves a useful point of analysis. The design, and presence or lack, of international governance structures determined the way in which international relations and law were conducted; the point being that there is an interplay between design and conduct. This point – of the shape of the system determining the conduct of the actors within it, and vice versa – is a common theme among realists, liberals, and constructivists alike: IR scholars, like Kenneth Waltz, Robert Cox, John Ikenberry and others, each from a diverse tradition of scholarship all attempt to properly define the relationship between the system and its parts. 

Hence, the First World War, the most significant and all-consuming conflict in living memory, is particularly noteworthy. While its immediate cause was Austrian intervention in Serbia – in response to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand – some suggest that the underlying factor was the spread of imperialism and the concomitant escalation of competition between rival European states. Therefore, the changing nature of the international system – mostly those who sought, or sought to retain, power – fundamentally led to the outbreak of war. European colonial powers dominated the world through empire. It was their concerns, and their competition with each other, that determined how states interacted. In this system, which was characterised by the existence of self-serving alliances and an absence of formally constituted intergovernmental organisation to, for example, prevent war, the ensuing chaos is easier to understand.

The Second World War, on the other hand, is the product of the League of Nation’s (LoN) failure. The establishment of the LoN, the first intergovernmental organisation of its kind, as a direct response to the causes of the First World War is instructive. With a primary focus on the prevention of wars, collective security, disarmament, and international dispute settlements, it was intended – through mechanisms of negotiation and crisis-aversion – to prevent such a catastrophe from occurring again.  However, in the absence of a standing army to enforce its decisions in conflicts, and without an executive capable of making binding decisions, the LoN’s heavy reliance on the Great Powers was its ultimate downfall. The non-participation of the United States and the Soviet Union aside, its treatment of members on the principle of strict equality, and the weak consequences for non-compliance, prevented the LoN from fulfilling its mandate – especially where Great Powers or their immediate allies were in a state of conflict with one another. And when they did, the LoN was powerless to intervene.

By contrast with the pre-First World War structure therefore, even though this system was highly formalised, the design of the system itself undercut its ability to function. The UN was accordingly designed with the benefit of hindsight and the intention of promoting and maintaining international order, mediate disputes between its members, promoting human rights, providing humanitarian assistance and fostering socio-economic development. Yet like its predecessor, the UN’s lofty ideals have remained elusive in practice. As many suggest, it is incapable of answering difficult questions, especially when the answers involve a dilution of the P5’s power. Three reasons persist as to why this is so, and why the prospects of any fundamental change to the existing distribution of power seem unlikely.

First, the UN has not changed the sovereign nature of states. Its activities are able to occur because states accede directly or indirectly, and retain their sovereignty, if not in an absolute sense. A multiplicity of rules exist governing which aspects of the UN’s agenda its members must, may, or can, comply with. The inclusion of ‘opt-outs’ means that on issues where states’ self-interest run contrary to international consensus, their enduring sovereign status means they can disallow the application of UN resolutions to its own affairs. North Korea’s blasé retention of nuclear weapons, Syria’s dismissal of condemnation of its use of chemical weapons, and Zimbabwe’s perpetuation of human rights abuses are just a few examples highlighting the UN’s weakness. Equally, self-interest can also be used to explain why many states do co-operate, even where they may not necessarily agree. Put crudely, states comply with the UN in order to confer benefits that specifically apply to them. They engage with the UN positively or negatively depending on what is at stake: it is rooted in the exercise of sovereignty.

Second, maintaining a focus on the Security Council, as opposed to the General Assembly, exposes one an additional structural hindrance. Whereas the former acts as the executive and is vested with real power (to make binding resolutions), the latter is largely a non-binding and advisory body. The UN’s founding Charter created this asymmetrical distribution of power because the P5 were viewed as being the most interested in the maintenance of peace and most likely to act for the greater good. That notion, as with all states, is mistaken. In times of conflict, the potential for gridlock when P5 members are at loggerheads with each other can be lethal. No better example of this exists than the Cold War: the UN’s ability to do anything effective was limited due to the veto-wielding United States and USSR’s geopolitical interests. This was so much of a problem that during the Cold War many security issues were devolved to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. And, as with the case of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, states either decided to act unilaterally or through mechanisms which exist outside the UN to pursue their aims.

Third, the lack of a standing army and inability to independently raise an operating budget makes it more pliable to the agenda of the P5, and a few others, who usually supplies arms, troops and funding. The spoils of war – as the original victors – means that the P5 members not only retain formalised political power. Their politically enhanced status also seems to have had a correlate effect on their economics: clearly, the ability to protect the world and maintain peace has also come with a certain ability to front the bill. As Nkrumah may have said, ‘Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else will follow.’ This means that operationally, the UN is not as independent as it may need to be. This is worrisome when P5 members act in a way that prejudices smaller, weaker, nations and where an organisation like the UN, representing the collective will of most of the world, could have the moral and political force to stop it. Effectively, by not being able to raise money through a mandatory contribution by members, means that the UN dances to the tune of whomever pulls the purse strings.

This is not to suggest that the UN has not been responsible for some positive change. Its work in the areas of humanitarian relief, in particular, is worthy of the kind of admiration it presently receives. But, it would be naïve to suggest that what the UN does and what it was originally hoped to achieve are remotely similar. Any change, has generally been within the limits of what the P5, and its other major contributors, want.

These problems arises in large part from the UN’s structure: the interests of the permanent members of the Security Council, who have a veto over the issuance of all resolutions binding on member states, are predominant. Given that permanent member status remains for most states the crucial symbol of polarity, the likelihood of fundamental reform to a system benefiting a small coterie of states seems unlikely. Thus, although multipolarity may be observable in some international theatres, the survival of the UN’s current structure tends to promote business as usual.

Even without contemplating the rise of countries new powers such as India and Germany, it is clear to see how the structure of the UN perpetuates the P5’s power and preserves itself against changes that dilute their power. And a more independent, reformed, UN is exactly what the powerful states capable of changing the system want to avoid: in the alternative, the UN represents a rival powerbase to their own. The UN has been unable to fundamentally change the character of international relations. If anything, its existence merely adds a thin veneer of legitimacy to what can otherwise, and accurately, be described as a perpetuation of the power of countries whose rule was truncated when the last bullet of the Second World War was fired. Self-interest is notably not limited to the P5 alone: for as long as the state remains sovereign, it will determine its own agenda, and strategically determine its self-interest. The UN, therefore, has little real ability to reshape the international order.