The United Nations’ Approach to Freedom of Expression

Resolution 16/18 and the Istanbul Process

Amelia Cooper

Saudi Arabia is notorious for its flagrant disregard of human rights, and has recently faced renewed international criticism for upholding Raif Badawi’s unjustifiable sentence of 1000 lashes and 10 years in prison for establishing a progressive blog that called for religious tolerance and women’s rights. Incarcerated on the grounds of ‘insulting Islam’, Badawi is a prisoner of conscience: his “crime” is exercising his right to freedom of expression. Saudi Arabia was therefore a surprising and unlikely choice of location for the last meeting of the Istanbul Process, a series of conferences dedicated to the combating of religious intolerance.

The Istanbul Process was created with the intention of ensuring the full and consensual implementation of United Nations Human Rights Council 16/18, entitled ‘Combating Incitement to hatred, discrimination and violence based on religion or belief’. The resolution, adopted in 2011 and reaffirmed in subsequent years, most recently in March 2015, marked a movement away from the problematic and divisive concept of “defamation of religions”. The “defamation of religions” agenda sought to protect religions, rather than religious adherents: such a position stands at odds with the notion of human rights, which (as one might expect) are afforded to individuals, rather than ideas.

Resolution 16/18 committed states to pursuing a rights-based approach in tackling discrimination, incitement and intolerance, and was justly celebrated by states and civil society actors alike. The resolution is practical in two ways; it calls upon states to ‘encourage the creation of collaborative networks’ and create a governmental mechanism to ‘identify and address potential areas of tension between members of different religious communities’, and furthermore encourages the training of governmental officials in effective outreach. The Istanbul Process is one such network, the essence of it being to further ‘a result orientated engagement’. It has convened delegates, experts and civil society actors five times since the adoption of 16/18. However, incidents of religious discrimination remain prevalent and are increasing worldwide, reinforced and legitimised by harsh blasphemy laws.

One need only glance at the international news to see that the goals of 16/18 and the Istanbul Process remain elusive: from the atrocities committed by the so-called Islamic State, to the persecution of minorities in Myanmar, to rising Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in the West, it is clear that there is a long way to go. It would, of course, be unrealistic to have hoped that the four years since the resolution’s adoption could have eliminated all sectarian conflict. However, Resolution 16/18 ‘represents the only universally-agreed policy framework to guide the international community’s response’ (though as we see below, universally does not mean unanimously): the gulf between state commitments and practical application is therefore unacceptable, and requires immediate redress. Much attention has been given to both technical and normative guidance, including the development of instruments such as the Rabat Plan of Action, which outlines the scope of state obligations under Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The outcome of a four year initiative led by the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, the Rabat Plan provides further clarification on the obligations of states (and responsibilities of other actors, including the media) regarding the prohibition of incitement to violence, hostility and discrimination. At the crux of the implementation gap, therefore, is not an information deficit or an absence of instruction: it is a lack of state will. 

Demonstrating State commitment to Resolution 16/18 must surely begin with ensuring that domestic legislation is in accordance with the international legal provisions with regard to freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression. However, de facto blasphemy laws continue to exist in 55 countries, 39 of which punish the “crime” with incarceration. The international human rights consensus is clear: the use of blasphemy laws necessarily violates international law. The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 34, in the authoritative interpretation of states’ obligations under Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights explicitly repudiated the “defamation of religions” agenda.  Furthermore, numerous NGOs have noted that blasphemy laws heighten interfaith and inter-communal animus and serve to legitimise extrajudicial violence: they are the antithesis of the environment of respect and rights that 16/18 seeks to create. Yet more shocking is that apostasy is met with the death sentence in 13 countries – and, in a glaring expression of hypocrisy, four of those thirteen states are current members of the UN Human Rights Council – including Saudi Arabia.

The Istanbul Process convened last week in Jeddah, and was hosted by the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation. I spoke to Andrew Smith, legal officer and UN Representative at Article 19, who attended the conference: his primary concern was the persistence of a fundamental disagreement as to what Resolution 16/18 represents. Where it appeared that the (bulk of) Western states consider Resolution 16/18 and the concomitant guidelines as forming the final framework to address questions of freedom of expression and freedom of religion or belief, most OIC members seemed to treat it as a compromise position, the terms and interpretation of which remain up for debate. In essence, one side considers the foundations to have been set, while the other seeks a redrawing of the boundaries: they are operating on different ideological planes.

Such a sentiment was echoed by Sejal Parmar, international human rights lawyer, specialising in freedom of expression, based at the Central European University, Budapest. She noted that the scope and meaning of freedom of expression, particularly in its interface with insult and incitement (two distinct but frequently conflated terms), remains one of the most intractable controversies at the Council. The passage of Resolution 16/18 by consensus is by no means representative of a unanimous opinion on the boundaries of freedom of expression: these remain highly contested, and the movement away from discussions on defamation of religious has simply meant that the conflict has moved into different arenas besides the increasingly fraught Istanbul Process to issues such as “traditional values” or the “family”. That said, the reappearance of the defamation of religions agenda at the Council is far from impossible. What is required for the realisation of the goals of Resolution 16/18 and the Istanbul Process is a legislative and policy change within states, which depends on an attitudinal change: how to achieve this is the most important, and difficult, question that the Council faces.

During our conversations, Smith and Parmar noted a number of issues pertaining to the Istanbul Process, the redress of which could ameliorate the implementation gap. First, Smith commented on the high-level nature of the debate: rather than Ministers of Home Affairs or Culture being present (i.e. the individuals who would be responsible for enacting the changes encouraged by the Istanbul Process), states were represented by delegates and ambassadors. From this emerges a certain psychology: if the personnel of the Process tend to be international representatives (who have frequented the halls of the UN), they will operate in this area of expertise. It is in fact domestic policymakers who have the power to implement the guidance of Resolution 16/18, and therefore their engagement is of paramount importance. Parmar furthered this in noting that the conference only lasted for a day and a half: the Istanbul Process should be the time for hard policy and guidance development, rather than being treated as a talking shop.

Secondly, Smith noted that very few of the original diplomats engaged in the drafting of Resolution 16/18 were present, while Parmar commented that the Istanbul Process’ status appeared to have degenerated somewhat. When considered in the context of its time, the resolution was a dramatic rejection of an agenda that had been pursued for over a decade: its landmark significance must not be forgotten.

Finally, both Smith and Parmar noted that accusations of double standards continued to be levied by both the West and the OIC. The aforementioned irony of holding a conference on freedom of expression while Raif Badawi is arbitrarily imprisoned, facing cruel and inhumane punishment, was raised by a number of civil society actors, and quickly brushed aside by those managing the meetings. Since upholding Badawi’s sentence and facing renewed international outcry, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has released a statement that it ‘will not tolerate such outrageous, ridiculous interference in its sovereign justice system’. Furthermore, the explicit protection afforded to atheists and non-believers in General Comment 22 to Article 18 of the ICCPR (‘Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief’) has not gained traction with the majority of OIC states: references to minority groups continue to focus on theists. However, criticisms on the grounds of duplicity were equally levied towards European states, notably with regard to the unequal treatment of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents. Members of the OIC also highlighted the persistence of blasphemy laws in Western countries: while many of these are dead-letter laws, they certainly harm the credibility and legitimacy of interventions that criticise state-sanctioned discrimination. Smith reinforced that there is no double standard when it comes to freedom of expression: there is one standard, and there are states across all regions and religious persuasions who fail to meet it.

So, where do we go from here? How can we take further steps towards realising the goals of Resolution 16/18, towards ameliorating the sectarian conflicts that continue to simmer and rage? What we can identify is a wealth of technical and normative guidance; the need for legal changes and a shift in attitudes; and a number of issues that inhere in the current treatment of the Istanbul Process. Thankfully, within these three broad categories lie the seeds of answers to each of them. Changes to legislation and attitudes can only be achieved with the employment of the instruments and guidelines that are available, and resolving the problems experienced in Jeddah will help create the space to do so. We do not need to develop new policies or guidelines, but instead need to build on and improve our application of those that already exist. While the debate over the bounds of freedom of expression will undoubtedly continue, the centralisation and increasing understanding of Resolution 16/18, the Rabat Plan and the Istanbul Process within the dialogue is an essential remedy to the potential resurgence of the defamation agenda.

It is worth noting, however, that these recommendations pertain to high level and legislative change. As members of an increasingly global society, we too have a role: to engage in inter-religious dialogue, to promote an environment of tolerance and respect, and to deliberately cast out stereotypes in favour of building the mutual understanding envisioned in Resolution 16/18.  As Marc Limon said, ‘the road to Istanbul is through Rabat’ – but you can take part in the journey.

For further information:

Andrew Smith @access2smith @article19un

Sejal Parmar @_SejalParmar

New Pieces on the International Chessboard

An Internationally-Active Sub-State: A Neglected Effect of Globalization?

Nicholas Gordon

Many important questions have been raised with the Scottish National Party’s recent electoral successes, but a question with repercussions beyond the United Kingdom concerns how a more autonomous Edinburgh will be treated by the international community. Even as independence is ruled out, greater Scottish authority is almost certain. And, with that local authority, will come greater international prominence.

But the United Kingdom is not the only place where a sub-state can have, or has had, an international impact. The past few years have seen crises that involve autonomous sub-state units as major players, from Catalonia and Crimea in Europe, Iraqi Kurdistan in the Middle East, and Hong Kong in East Asia. In all of these areas, significant and exceptional autonomy has allowed these units to act on the international stage. In addition, all of these regions interact with the international system without relying on state institutions—they are independent actors, at least in part.

It has been argued that globalization is transforming the state, as they become more disaggregated and its power is expressed across multiple institutions. Others argue that the state is being replaced with other kinds of actors, be it the non-territorial multinational corporation, non-governmental organization or terrorist group, or the supranational regional institution.

Globalization is transforming the state, as it becomes more disaggregated and its power is expressed across multiple institutions

But one class of political unit is often left out of these discussions: the sub-state, or those territorial political units that lie (or are recognized to be) within a state’s sovereign jurisdiction. As the international system becomes more connected, the sub-state can more easily and noticeably engage with the international system – be it through short-term political engagement, or longer-term institutional engagement. Increasingly global problems requires sub-states to engage with the international community to fully exercise their domestic authority, and the ease of international communication and travel means that sub-states can solve these problems without involving the state.

It is understandable why theoretical attention would go elsewhere. Supranational institutions can be seen as composites of sovereign members, even if they become actors in their own right, while MNCs and NGOs seem to exist “beyond” traditional sovereignty by virtue of being non-territorial. In contrast, sub-state units are decidedly not sovereign, by existing in a hierarchy with the state.

We can see this tension when looking at those units commonly called “de facto states”. Somaliland is a de facto state by virtue of Somalia’s complete collapse; while Taiwan’s and South Ossetia’s independence are bolstered by American and Russian protection respectively.  As sovereignty is seen to be intrinsically good in all cases, sub-states can only gather sovereignty against the state’s will, either from failed capacity or foreign protection.

However, this binary view ignores the avenues through which a sub-state can become an international actor. Take Hong Kong, whose autonomy is very much not a story about a lack of Chinese power. Two examples stand out: the Manila Hostage Crisis of 2010 (political engagement) and Edward Snowden’s 2013 escape to the city (institutional engagement).

Hong Kong’s response to the Manila hostage crisis was a deliberate attempt to effect change in a foreign country. In retaliation to a perceived botched response, Hong Kong placed sanctions on Filipino officials and a travel warning on the whole country — for a time, Hong Kong officially deemed the Philippines more unsafe than Syria. What fueled the government’s anger was a perceived snub by President Benigno Aquino who, rather than speaking directly to Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, instead summoned the Chinese Ambassador.

In contrast, Snowden’s escape to Hong Kong reveals more institutionalized engagement. Every step of Snowden’s escape to Hong Kong was facilitated by Hong Kong’s independent ‘foreign policy’. Snowden escaped to Hong Kong through its visa-waiver program with the United States; upon his arrival, Washington called on Hong Kong to honor its extradition treaty. Neither of these agreements exists between Washington and Beijing, arguably, do not exist between Hong Kong and Beijing.

Hong Kong, although quite extreme in its level of autonomy, is not the only example of a sub-state with international connections. Another, more complex, case is Iraqi Kurdistan, whose path to autonomy is a mix of foreign protection, a weakened state, and more efficient local capacity. Irbil has built strong economic and security links with surrounding countries. Most important of these is Turkey. Whereas Ankara initially refused to support any American intervention in Iraq if it led to an independent Kurdistan, it is now the biggest foreign investor in Iraqi Kurdistan and works with Irbil on security concerns.

The barriers preventing sub-states from engaging with the international system are slowly eroding

Many of these foreign connections — such as Irbil’s independent negotiation of oil rights — are developed in spite of Baghdad. However, it is also true that Kurdistan has yet to make a serious push towards independence beyond hypothetical statements. It is likely that Kurdistan’s international connections would vanish upon independence; it would be a certainty for Turkey, which is currently resolving its own Kurdish insurgency. Surprisingly, Kurdistan may be able to do more in practice if it remains a   highly autonomous part of Iraq than what it could do as an independent state.

It is this observation that points us towards the future. Kurdistan is not the only sub-state that has realized that both local authority and international engagement can be gained in spite of a lack of statehood, as Taiwan and Nagorno-Karabakh have come to similar conclusions. This is not to deny the real benefits and symbolic appeal of independence, but rather to argue that the structure of the international system allows sub-states to do a lot more now than they could before.

The barriers preventing sub-states from engaging with the international system are slowly eroding. There were initially few reasons why a sub-state would need to have an international presence, as few problems were global. Even when a sub-state needed to engage with the international system, the difficulty and expense of travel and communication meant that the sub-state would rely on state mechanisms. Combine this with a more absolutist view of the state, and sub-states had little ability, or need, to engage internationally.

Why would a state government suppress a sub-state’s attempts at economic diplomacy if it actually serves to bolster economic development?

Contrast this to today. International travel is cheap; international communication significantly more so. Problems and, more importantly, the solutions to those problems have an international dimension. It is not that the state is becoming less relevant, or is less capable of doing this work. Instead, it is easier for a sub-state to engage on its own, without needing to rely on the state.

Greater sub-state engagement will happen for all the same reasons that the world is supposedly becoming more globalized: easier communication, cheaper transportation, the spread of the international economy and the rise of truly global problems. As transnational networks grow, there are more avenues for a sub-state to engage with the international system. It also means that the benefits of allowing a sub-state to have this authority grows: why would a state government suppress a sub-state’s attempts at economic diplomacy if it actually serves to bolster economic development?

This is not to say that we will see an “explosion” of sub-state diplomacy, or that the state will disappear as a central actor. What we commonly understand to be diplomacy — leader-to-leader diplomacy and major diplomatic summits — will still likely be done on a state-to-state basis. But underneath that, where the nitty-gritty of day-to-day authority is expressed, will lie a whole panoply of connections, involving both state and sub-state.

The Rise of Cyber Warfare

The spread of international relations into the cyber realm will fundamentally change inter-state conflict by 2030

Isabella Steel

Technological development has been a defining feature of the twenty-first century. By 2030 its influence in the military sphere will be acutely evident, impacting relations and conflict between technologically sophisticated nations (particularly those geographically distant) with potentially devastating consequences. This article will explore how the adoption of cyber-weaponry as a hostile tool of sabotage and espionage by states will change the character of war and the relationship between citizens and government; alter the global power balance; and necessitate a reappraisal of laws and outlooks regarding traditional forms of conflict.

Once the hobby of largely benevolent, technologically inquisitive individuals, cyber-weaponry has been superseded not only by criminal and corporate groups, but by nation-states in international relations, often with hostile intent. In 2010 Stuxnet, allegedly a US-Israeli malware, ravaged Iran’s nuclear programme in what one computer security expert argued was tantamount to “physical damage”. Georgia similarly suffered crippling denial-of-service attacks traced to Russian Business Network – also said to possess strong links to the government – during the Russian invasion in 2008. The technological sophistication, plentiful resources and indiscriminate scope that governments enjoy renders cyber-weaponry a powerful tool at their disposal.

Violence will no longer be expressed through the bombing of a single school but the national networks in which all schools rely

Governments’ utilisation of cyber espionage and sabotage will fundamentally change the character of war. Far removed from Tennyson’s six-hundred soldiers who “flash’d all their sabres bare/flash’d as they turn’d in air/Sabring the gunners there”, physical proximity in conflict will cease, as will isolation of conflict to just military and political realms. Violence will no longer be expressed through the bombing of a single school or hospital, but the national networks on which all schools and hospitals rely will be compromised. Michelle Zook, a retired US squadron section commander, warned in 2015 that a “retaliatory denial of service attack this year might become a complete shutdown of a power grid within five years,” highlighting just one component of national infrastructures that may be targeted.

Indeed, the 2015 S4x15 Security Conference in Miami lamented the emergence of BlackEnergy malware, traced to Russian group Sandworm, which infiltrates critical infrastructure such as pipe lines and power generators. Popular involvement in inter-state conflict will also increase through state employment of civilian hackers, as in Russia and China. Crucially, unlike military and intelligence personnel, they are cheap, effective and can be disbanded and mobilised rapidly upon request.

Wider changes in the government-citizen relations will too be interesting to observe. North Korea and China, traditionally controlling online access as a tool of oppression, may be forced to relax Internet restrictions to facilitate the organic emergence of a computer literate and technologically innovative generation. Military force will also become increasingly futile if inter-state conflict becomes dictated in the cyber-realm. Government investment will necessarily shift from maintenance of military forces to development of cyber-weaponry, potentially rendering military-backed dictatorships harder to sustain.

Conflict will also become less clear-cut, with difficulty distinguishing between civilian/military cyber-networks; combatants/non-combatants; and legal/illegal infiltration of online systems. Identifying perpetrators and acts of cyber-conflict will be hard, particularly given consistent Russian and Chinese denial of cyber-crime. The lack of physical warning signs, such as an armed presence, and the ease of remote execution of cyber-sabotage, renders the traditional delineation of conflict along national boundaries increasingly difficult.

North Korea and China may be forced to relax Internet restrictions to facilitate the emergence of a computer literate generation

Cyber-warfare will accordingly upset the current global power structure. Since 1945, Western democracies have sought to avoid direct military confrontation with each other. The ease with which cyber-espionage translates into sabotage and averts traditional military violence may change this dynamic. David Gorodyanksky, CEO of private software developer AnchorFree, argues that since the US allegedly spied on Germany, they fundamentally have “no reason not to do the same.” Less developed countries will be also able to enjoy greater and disproportionate influence in the global power game: the cyber realm’s intended use to facilitate the easy spread of information has created an inherent imbalance in favour of the aggressor, as it is difficult to restrict global information flows. Organisations, corporations, and individuals thus have the potential to enjoy a major, global impact – such as Julian Assange, or Estonia’s outsized influence in global cyber-security policy discussions.

The proliferation of cyber-conflict could also change East-West relations. The technological parity of the East, and the widespread utilisation of cyber methods by China, Russia and North Korea may mean this newly characterised warfare gives them greater opportunity to exert global influence and bid for international ascendency. This may catalyse the shift of power to the East and the full emergence of China as a superpower.

Furthermore, cyber-warfare threatens to greatly perpetuate antipathy between the US and China. Indeed, East-West tensions have already been stirred by cyber-espionage due to its substitution for military conflict as a modern form of warfare. Heightened US-Russian antagonism has also raised fears: Russian Turla malware was discovered to have been targeting foreign agents of former Easter Bloc nations since 2010, while US cyber-security firm FireEye found evidence of the aforementioned Sandworm  spying on NATO members. Indeed, President Obama’s 2011 US Cyberspace Policy Review warned that cyber-weaponry poses “some of the most serious economic and national security challenges of the 21st century”. Moreover, a US Defence Department report published the same year declared that harmful cyber action could be met with a parallel response in another domain, illustrating how conflict could easily escalate. While cyber-espionage and sabotage are used by the West and East alike, the fact that the morality and accountability of cyber-criminals is often limited to that of the governments they serve – including North Korea, Russia and China –  is a chilling thought.

International attempts at resolution have been proffered, accompanied by widespread recognition that international laws of conflict must be adapted to extend beyond a military sphere. Firstly, engagement must be expanded to match the growth of the problem. The Global Commission of Internet Governance was established in January 2014 to restore public trust and engagement with the Internet. Meeting at The Hague in April 2015, it advocates greater public awareness of cyber-security practices and training of the software industry globally to encourage more secure networks.

That the morality and accountability of cyber-criminals is often limited to that of the governments they serve is a chilling thought

Secondly, the international legal framework must adapt. The US International Strategy for Cyberspace writes that, consistent with the UN Charter, states have “an inherent right to self-defence that aggressive acts in cyberspace may trigger.” Defining “aggressive acts” remains contentious, however: no standardised terminology exists, with understanding of terms such as ‘information’ or ‘cyber-attack’ varying globally. There must be agreement about how to characterize and categorize such terms, before wider policy can be articulated.

Thirdly, while there should be a determined focus on identifying shared global outlooks, cooperation is vital in the domestic sphere, with greater collaboration needed between corporations and national governments. In his 2015 State of the Union Address, President Obama called for legislation to bolster cyber-security across US government and private industrial spheres; shield from liability companies that inform government about computer threats; and force companies to be more forthcoming about loss of online consumer data. Such policies may be difficult to enforce, however, given American scepticism about federal government intervention.

It is hard to anticipate the true impact of cyber-weaponry in civil war or regional conflicts, especially in regions such as the Middle East where brutal physical atrocities seem likely to continue in the short-term. However, the rise of cyber espionage and cyber-weaponry will, by 2030, have fundamentally changed the character of war by placing all aspects of society under threat, and necessitating a reassessment of attitudes, accountability and conduct in inter-state relations.

Time to Engage: The United Nations Human Rights Council

AMELIA COOPER 

As students of Oxford approach the final weeks of term, some taut faced as they look towards their examinations, others lucky enough to have cast off their Sub Fusc to lounge on college lawns, human rights experts, delegates and civil society actors will convene in Geneva for the 29th Session of the United Nations Human Rights Council. 

The Council is the principal human rights body of the United Nations, composed of 47 member states responsible for the promotion and protection of international human rights, with other states sitting as observers. The Council’s work is enhanced by engagement with civil society organizations, experts, and academics. Convening three times a year for regular sessions, and at numerous points to respond to crises, the Council is a forum for the development of new resolutions, legislation and norms that form the foundations of the international human rights framework. It provides opportunities for thematic and country-specific discussion, with the intention of serving as, in UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s words, ‘a springboard for action’. Each session takes a slightly different focus: at each session, various reports are delivered by Special Rapporteurs, while interactive dialogue panels are held with experts. Furthermore, countries come under review at every session, both formally and informally. The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is a process under which the human rights records of UN member states are subjected to scrutiny by their peers, who offer recommendations as to how the situation may be improved. Heralded as one of the best and most practical mechanisms of the Council, the UPR is central to state accountability. On an informal level, innumerable speeches are made which draw attention to specific instances of concern in many countries.

However, the work of the Council is imperfect, and the good intentions of key actors are often frustrated by a lack of will or commitment from States. As Rosa Freedman, an eminent academic specializing in the UN and international human rights law, notes, ‘when we talk of the UN, we are talking about the collective will of its members’. One need only look to the gulf between the rights set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and its concomitant binding agreements, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the ground-level reality of violations and abuse throughout the world to see that there is much to be done. This extends even to the increasingly politicized Council, where resolutions and declarations are often obfuscated for strategic purposes.

Redressing such a disparity is a daunting task; however, engagement with the Council is a key area in which we can all play a role. Taking note of the what goes on within the Council, from resolution debates to speeches made by civil society actors and States, is an essential step in ensuring the countries are held to account for the statements and commitments (both positive and negative) that they make. Currently, a dearth of coverage and interest has leant States a feeling of near impunity, allowing them to act in a reprehensible manner without fear of condemnation. What happens at the Council is of fundamental significance in shaping the international human rights framework: it affects us all.

The June session, opening this Monday, has a packed and varied agenda, encompassing issues from migrants’ rights to counter-terrorism, education to summary executions, and UPR outcomes for fourteen countries. Providing a coherent summary of the agenda is impossible; however, it can be accessed online here. Notable is the attendance of the new Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, David A. Kaye, who will deliver his first report, focusing on data privacy and encryption. Given the rumoured revival of the Snooper’s Charter and Cameron’s apparent disregard for the value of anonymity and privacy online, this is something that British citizens should be particularly engaged with.

Wherever your interests lie, it is clear that human rights are an increasingly prominent dimension of international relations and the happenings within the Human Rights Council require close attention. Perhaps the best sources of information are the civil society groups that attend: deeply engaged with the work that takes place, yet removed from the political games that are played by States, they have a unique ability to see – and show – the Council’s inner machinations. In that vein, I would encourage readers to engage with the Council via social media (civil society groups and most delegations have Twitter, Facebook etc.), to blog and talk about what is happening in Geneva, and to hold your governments to account to ensure that the Council retains its legitimacy and accountability, such that it can serve as the springboard that it was intended to be.

These twitter accounts may be of interest to readers:

All human rights, follow @fidh_un @fidh_en @ishrglobal @philippe_dam @nico_agostini @hrw @FreedomHouseDC

Freedom of expression, @article19un @indexcensorship @_SejalParmar 

Freedom of assembly and association and the protection of human rights defenders, @CIVICUSalliance @panafricannet

Freedom of religion or belief, @BHAhumanists @AmeliaCCooper @elizabethocasey @iheu @center4inquiry @mdedora @CSWEurope @RNS @brianpellot

Securing equal access to human rights for LGBTQIA, @ARCint1 @HRC

Disclaimer: This is by no means an exhaustive list, and is reflective of the author’s interests and bias.

The New Pacific Climate

Will China continue to accept the US-built liberal economic order while continuously pushing for a larger share?

Justin Chock in SIR Trinity term 2015

Recent Chinese construction of airstrips and artificial islands, alongside the possibility of American patrols contesting these projects, are giving new life to the “China-threat” and “power-transition war” schools in academic international relations. The current Sino-American relationship looks tense, but does this mean that conflict is on the horizon? The wide view of the relationship suggests not; instead the 2030 trans-Pacific dynamic looks to be a competitive, but peaceful, sharing of power. Indeed, while in the short-term we are still testing the stormy waters of a ‘new style’ of superpower relations, these tempests will eventually calm without conflict to form a dynamic of shared power within Asia.

In the worst-case scenario, however, the US and China will view their relationship as a zero-sum competition of strength, and thus if conflict breaks out, it will be under this dangerous mind-set. The following analysis examines this assumption, focusing firstly on the military dimension as the primary source of conflict, followed by an analysis of likely economic conflict, and lastly a consideration of their respective soft power capabilities. All three ultimately represent potential areas of conflict that could devolve into a military struggle; fortunately the most likely outcomes in all three areas feature only peaceful competition.

The 2030 trans-Pacific dynamic looks to be a competitive, but peaceful, sharing of power

Firstly, from a military perspective, the US has and will have an absolute advantage in terms of defence capabilities. Numerous reports underscore the fundamental problems in the ranks of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), such as endemic corruption, an overcomplicated and inefficient organizational structure, and operational inexperience. Many cite China’s rising defence spending as evidence of future growth in its armed forces, but as Professor Peter Robertson notes, the increasing economic prosperity in China is paradoxically making purchases more expensive: since the military budget hovers at around 2% of GDP, the absolute increases in military spending, with price increases taken into account, provide approximately the same purchasing power and thus capabilities. Consequently, projecting a relatively unchanging military power gap, the US – not to mention its numerous Asia-Pacific allies – will safely maintain a military advantage from now through to 2030. This unchanging inequality is something that the PLA would not reasonably want to challenge challenge due to the low likelihood of success.

The US, on the other hand, recognizes that its commitments across the world are spreading its forces worryingly thin. Should a limited conflict arise within the Asia-Pacific region, China would have the regional upper hand due to its greater concentration of forces in the area. This is largely due to China’s Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2AD) methods, designed to exclude an opponent’s forces from a specific territory or deny those forces the ability to use or transit resources. Such a strategy is primarily defensive, and would not escalate the conflict as much as the likely US counter of its Air Sea Battle strategy. Due to the overwhelming force needed to neutralize A2AD sites deep within Chinese territory and behind layers of defensive forces, any such counter would likely usher in a full-scale war. So playing out both strategies shows that the US understands that excessive provocations could quickly force the other side to enact a strategy that leads to war.

China and the US are beginning to build trust, and inter-military cooperation is actually on the rise

The fact that this downward spiral rests on a hairpin trigger is precisely why America shares China’s hesitance about initiating hostilities. Last November’s pledges to establish official inter-military notification mechanisms are a recognition of the volatility of the situation, and represent concrete steps from both sides taken to avoid any escalation. Indeed, the ongoing ‘pivot to Asia’ will cause the two nations to come into even more contact and thus more friction between them is likely in East Asia. Viewed through this lens, assertive measures like island-building in the South China Sea are short-term, calculated ways to push the competition forward that have been determined not to be detrimental to the underlying peace, and so measures like this will continue through 2030 without large-scale battles surrounding them.

As the notification mechanisms demonstrate, China and the US are beginning to build mutual trust, and inter-military cooperation is actually on the rise. The 2014 Rim of the Pacific military exercises demonstrated a historic moment in this regard, as this was the first time the PLA Navy participated in the world’s largest international maritime exercise. Although some criticized China for including an uninvited intelligence collection ship, US Pacific Commander Admiral Locklear noted that China is in fact acting under the international norm that permits military and surveillance operations within a nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone. China is not revising global norms as the ‘China-Threat’ school believes, but instead is beginning to exploit them to serve its own rational interests.

China is not revising global norms but instead is beginning to exploit them to serve its own rational interests

On the second front, although military issues are the greatest predictor of conflict, economic considerations reinforce the future vision of competitive power-sharing. Speculating upon China’s future economic growth has proved notoriously difficult. Answers range from the Chinese economy overtaking the US within the decade to never coming close. However, what is certain is that China is leveraging its growing economy, and the recent Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AAIB) is one way that the country is challenging the American-built system, which includes the Asian Development Bank, the IMF, and the World Bank.

However, the AIIB’s purpose is to provide infrastructure investments to only the Asian region and thus serves as a way for China to focus on consolidating local influence while continuing to let other organizations uphold the global economic system elsewhere. China benefits greatly from economic flows under the current system, but the nation does want a larger influence within the global economic structure, thereby making the economic climate by 2030 likely to be similar to the military one; namely limited competition that does not upset the overall order.

China benefits too greatly from economic flows under the current system – but the country does want a larger share of the global economic structure

Finally, while the US retains a vast amount of soft power, China’s attractive power seems to be growing. For example, the AIIB attracted many US-aligned states like the UK, Germany, and South Korea against American wishes, challenging the prevailing assumption of full American cooperation with these countries. Furthermore, the quickening rapprochement of the India-China relationship, combined with strengthening ties with Russia, demonstrates the increasing degree to which China is able to attract and deepen its partnerships, which could be seen as a balance against regional and global US alliances.

Nevertheless, these measures continue to pale in comparison to the global network that the US has formed: over 60 security partner nations, integration within the leadership of numerous major international institutions, and the American-led spread of liberal democratic ideals. As Professor Joseph Nye has argued, soft power is not necessarily zero-sum: although China may increase its global attractiveness, this may serve to reduce the likelihood of conflict as both countries become more attractive in each other’s eyes. Yet the future of Chinese soft power appears to be on a similar trajectory of a strengthening China that will begin to push back and hold its own, but not upset the overall dominance of America’s global brand.

Even from a hard-line zero-sum perspective on the relationship, time is on the side of a peaceful relationship between China and the US. Indeed, a continuation of competitive peace could play out in either of their favours. The US is waiting for China’s economic slowdown to lag behind the accelerating pace of the American economic recovery, or the possibility of liberal democratic ideals taking hold within China itself. China, for its part, will wait to allow its GDP growth to slowly push its global position past America’s, whilst hoping to quell its numerous domestic problems, thereby allowing the nation more power and a larger role on the world stage. Both scenarios require the maintenance of peaceful relations due to their economies relying so heavily on each other and their respective surrounding nations. Open conflict would swiftly cut all of those ties and undermine the long-term economic policies of both countries.

Consequently both sides have an impetus to prevent conflict with one another, while still pushing their own agendas as far as is compatible with this goal. The Sino-American relationship is too tense for a formalized alliance, but not tense enough for conflict. The middle ground lies therefore in an informal sharing of power that both sides have a stake in upholding. However, competition always has the potential to escalate out of control, and it will be up to these two superpowers to remain vigilant in their relations as they chart a shared path through choppy Pacific waters.