A BBC World Service in North Korea: a marriage for better or worse?

Edward Howell

“Where Google's mission is to organise the world's information, ours in a smaller way would be to understand it. We will work with anyone who can help us understand this ever more complex world.” (Tony Hall, BBC Director General)

The launch of the BBC World Service in North Korea is no sudden feat; for several years people (including myself) have been tirelessly trying to convince the organisation to broadcast, via some means, into ‘the nation in the dark’. The label is both figuratively and literally appropriate; the country has won the prize for becoming the world’s worst Internet black hole,  and aerial photographs show its stark lack of lighting compared to its neighbours. The BBC failed to act in the past, despite influential figures such as Lord Alton, Chairman of the British-DPRK All-Party Parliamentary Group, questioning why, ‘if the BBC provided access to truth in Nazi occupied France, the former Soviet bloc, in Burma, and to people subject to other totalitarian regimes, why are we not breaking the information blockade in North Korea?’ With the organization not shifting its stance, time passed, more time passed, and it seemed that a waiting game would be lost, until recently, when the recent decision to launch such a service was made. 

North Korea is indeed a unique and complex country; one that rests in its own time zone – Pyongyang Time – 8 hours and 30 minutes ahead of GMT – recently installed on the 70th anniversary of the country’s liberation from Japan. The nation and its people are governed by legal and socio-cultural values underpinned by the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of juche, an ideology carefully crafted by Kim Il-Sung, the 1st Supreme Leader of North Korea, and, posthumously, the Eternal President of the Republic, a hyperbolic title still bestowed upon him today. With the worst human rights record in the world, defectors have fled, many initially to South Korea, and then to the West. Stories are told and the North Koreans settle into their new ‘democratic’ lives. One defector living in London described his initial surprise at the cut and thrust of debate surrounding PMQs when watching BBC News, a once alien concept that, for him, is now the norm. Yet it is too easy – and perhaps naïve – for us in the West to assume the naivety of the North Korean people with respect to their understanding of the wider world beyond the Powerful and Prosperous Nation surrounding them. Through radios (often solar-powered, owing to the sporadic electricity in the country) sent to the country via defectors, North Koreans have been able to gain some awareness of the outside world. Thanks to their neighbour, China, Internet access has improved, and North Koreans are able to participate in the global culture of ‘binge-TV’. Whilst we are catching up on past episodes of Great British Bake Off on BBC iPlayer, North Koreans, in a similar vein to South Koreans, are binge-watching the latest (South) Korean drama series.

Now the BBC has become involved, or, perhaps, interfered? Only time will tell whether the former or latter most accurately describes the situation. The BBC World Service plans to broadcast a ‘daily radio news program’ to North Korea, which, upon first hearing, sounds a triumph, music to the ears of those who have longed for this to occur….but what ‘daily news?’ Daily news depicting global football results, (North Koreans are avid football fans, with the country’s team notably beating Italy in the 1966 World Cup), or a simple delivery of the latest global affairs? How will the translation process ensue?  A far greater challenge for the BBC rests with the broadcasting of local, national news in the state. The Kim regime goes to great effort in censoring, and filtering, radio and television for the people. Radios are designed to tune to specific state-controlled frequencies, and, as for television news, this is restricted to KCTV, a state-owned broadcaster, filling the houses of Pyongyang with propaganda delivered by melodramatic newsreaders. Interestingly, Ri Chun-Hee, KCTV’s face since 1974 prior to her retirement in 2012, became dubbed as the country’s ‘Heroine of Labour’, and the recipient of a luxurious lifestyle, owing to her ability to transform any news story on KCTV into a histrionic performance. The intervention of the BBC World Service could be interpreted as a projection of British soft power, as the state-owned organisation not only seeks to deliver ‘Britain’s impartial voice for the world’ but strengthen its own global reputation, in a country where any view divergent from that of the Kim regime is frowned upon. Nevertheless, to what does ‘impartial’ refer? Issues of translation should spark concern for the BBC; not only is the North Korean dialect of some contrast to the ‘standard’ Korean language spoken in the South, but more importantly, how will the translation ensure a fair representation of the BBC’s ‘impartial voice’, without posing potential for censorship and erasure by the state?

In the meantime, the decision to launch in the country will indubitably benefit the people. Speaking to North Korean defectors, the launch would be – for those back home – one step towards some form of engagement with the democratic world. Anxiety around radio transmission of the World Service, a common criticism to opponents of the World Service in the country, need not be a concern. For the North Koreans, that was the past, and, now, at least some voice, whether a whisper or a shout, can be given to the people. 

At present, bigger questions remain, including those relating to impartiality. When dealing with nation still entangled within the web of Cold War ideology, how will the BBC remain (truly) impartial in its broadcast? How will the obvious hurdles of government censorship and transmission of the World Service be overcome? Perhaps one day, the loudspeakers of North Korea situated over the DMZ, may sound the dulcet tones of a BBC newsreader, in response to the K-Pop blared across the border by the South. Unlikely, yes. Utopian, perhaps. It is difficult to say whether the marriage of the BBC World Service and North Korea will be for better, or for worse, in sickness, or in health, but this is the start of an obstacle-filled journey, one that will need to be made extremely cautiously. 

The Daodejing, fundamental to Daoism, a philosophy once prevalent in pre-1948 Korea, has given rise to the proverb that ‘a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.’ One step has so far been taken, but the next should be taken without trampling on the nation, such that all can reap the benefits – however large, or small – of the World Service. 

Reliably Unreliable: The EU's Continued Inaction is a Bad Sign

Rose Vennin

Suddenly summoned to react after the shocking picture of 3-year-old Aylan Kurdi impassioned citizens to demand a political response, European governments gave the disheartening impression last week of being faced with an unpredictable tsunami which had caught them unawares, and to which a clear response was nowhere to be seen. Yet this crisis comes as no surprise. Since the beginning of 2015, 2500 migrants have died in the Mediterranean while making their journey to Europe, and the on-going crisis has been subject to much discussion during the numerous summits this year. Until now, the European Union seemed to be muddling along, trying - and failing - to reach a consensus among its divided nations, measures taken woefully inadequate for the scale of the crisis. The June summit was such a display of bad-tempered exchanges between the national leaders of Europe with, among others, Italian PM Matteo Renzi reportedly saying “if this is your idea of Europe, you can keep it”, following bitter exchanges with Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite. 

Two months later, the bickering has not ended and Europe’s leaders were yet again at odds over the collective response in the face of pressing public concern. In a letter last Friday, France, Italy and Germany’s Ministers of Foreign Affairs called for “a fair distribution of refugees” throughout the EU. They stated "Europe must protect refugees in need of protection in a humane way - regardless of which EU country they arrive in." In contrast, the Visegrad states - Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia – affirmed their opposition to quotas of refugee relocation between countries at a meeting the same day, exemplifying the discordance that has been reigning for what seems to be too long (if not between these particular countries, then between others).

Indeed what this past week has shed light upon are, once again, the limits of current EU politics and frame of mind. As pressure on member states to come up with a coordinated plan mounts and will continue to rise as more refugees and economic migrants arrive, there is an evident lack of leadership, unity and vision. The long-term challenge for Europe is managing crises: the migrant crisis is one example of a larger issue with the union’s institutions and framework. As with Greece and the Euro crisis, the EU never appears to live up to its citizens’ expectations, moving sluggishly and in cacophony. 

So if Europe cannot actively come up with coherent responses to the challenges it faces, its durability may be threatened. Although there may be an underlying determination from EU leaders to hold the union together, it must be strongly displayed in contrast to their weak performance this summer, or repeated divisions and passiveness will get the better of it. Stumble after stumble, Europe needs to pick itself up once and for all.  Lives depend on it.

'Marching toward a united, peaceful world' - What Does China's Parade Mean?

Anonymous, Beijing

While in Europe, the migrant crisis may have obscured coverage of wider world affairs, in China there has only been one event this week. For weeks, factories, traffic and even barbecues have been restricted to improve the weather in preparation for a grand parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the victory over Japan in the Second World War. A three-day public holiday has been declared and “frivolous” television such as reality TV and comedy removed from the airwaves to make way for extensive broadcasting of war propaganda-dramas and documentaries. Wider Beijing this morning was near-deserted, with the streets empty and many businesses closed as seemingly everyone watched. However, despite the nation-wide public attention on the anniversary, the parade itself was completely closed off to the public, with even people living on the streets used being told to close their windows and watch it on television. Clearly, no effort was spared to ensure that everything went perfectly (despite a mysterious interruption in the live broadcast).

While it might seem at first glance, with the open cars of veterans in their nineties leading the parade, that World War II is no longer relevant, this parade was about the China of today. Gleaming military hardware, over 80% of which displayed in public for the first time, such as state-of-the-art truck-mounted missiles and drones, was followed by row on row of immaculate soldiers goose-stepping in the 30º heat. Seemingly chosen for their matching heights, the appearance of the soldiers was mirrored by their generals, who reportedly lost an average of 5kg in preparation for the parade. Above them, several extravagant flight shows took place, including giant Chinese flags hanging from helicopters (civil aviation was banned in advance and monkeys trained to clear the area of the nests of any birds that might interfere).

President Xi Jinping, appealing to old-school Communist Party sentiment with his austere Zhongshan suit and references to “Mao Zedong Thought”, addressed both “comrades and friends” in his address, during which he described China’s military as a force for peace, announcing some personnel cuts. All the while, the state cameras pointedly panned around such foreign leaders as Vladimir Putin; this is the first time such guests have attended a public military rally in China, and seems to be part of an effort to portray the country not only as a world power, but as part of a powerful network of allies, as shown by the inclusion of regiments from countries that also fought the Axis Powers, ranging from Serbia to Laos and the Pacific Islands. China has courted controversy with its choice of guests, hosting both South Korean President Park Geun-hye and a top aide to Kim Jong-un, as well as Ban Ki-moon, whose presence was strongly protested by Japan.

Japan’s agitation at Secretary-General Ban’s apparent legitimisation of the parade is not without reason. China is playing into a wider strain of anti-Japanese sentiment, and using twentieth century grievances with their neighbour to justify what could be described as encroachment into the surrounding area. However, for President Xi, the focus of the parade is still firmly on China - and on him, emphasising his role as commander of the armed forces as he scooted around Tiananmen Square in a motorcade hailing various regiments with an expression of vague boredom. While China has been increasingly assertive in recent years, this parade is a new level of public militarism, and keeps public interest in the army over such recent problems as the Tianjin disaster and ongoing market instability. It appears that whatever is going on behind the scenes in Beijing, the new public face of China is unapologetically nationalistic and militaristic - and armed to back up its pretensions to world power. 

Tradition vs. The American Security State

William Shirey, University of Pennsylvania

Despite the myths, the United States has never “isolated” itself. Washington and the Founding Fathers indeed wished to avoid “entanglement” – meaning the morass of alliances on the European continent that seemed to always give way to war – but this never meant avoiding foreign affairs. A Navy was commissioned, treaties of amity and commerce were signed, and a “Quasi-War” with France took place before the Federalists were out of office in 1801.

What the American Founding Fathers truly believed, apropos foreign affairs, was that a balance must be struck between executive prerogative on one hand and democracy on the other. The President must, indeed, be able to act with his own judgment in order to navigate geopolitics with any sort of efficacy. Yet a democratic nation’s foreign policy should be at least partially circumscribed by democratic principles; the voice of the people should act as a check. The derogation of American tradition exists not, as is so commonly asserted, in America’s postwar emergence as the prepotent nation on earth. Rather, the derogation is that the democratic voice has been entirely eschewed from foreign affairs. The American executive has arrogated itself as the vox dei; it has, with remarkably little protest from the public, crushed the vox populi underfoot.

When the United States first groped at empire in 1898 with the seizure of the Philippines, it was not acting far outside of tradition. “Manifest Destiny” had been lodged somewhere at the fundament of the American imagination ever since the first settlements flourished in New England and Virginia under the auspices of English colonialism. This “destiny” had led a generation of 19th century Americans to the West, and by the end of the 1850s, they had filled the continent. In the 1890s, however, it was clear that this view of “destiny” was not to stop at Oregon. The Anglo-Saxon world had been just recently infused with a Darwinian sense of racial superiority; Hawaii and the Philippines beckoned as a chance to assert both American hemispheric dominance along with the superiority of Christian civility. This was an extension of the unilateralism preached by Hamilton and the hemispheric assertion preached by John Quincy Adams.

Most importantly – and most in line with the founding intentions of the American Republic – the annexation of the Philippines was the subject of a ferocious public debate. William Jennings Bryan brought crowds to tears with his oratorically brilliant damnation of American imperialism; he invoked the intense pacifism of the Christian tradition and the caution of the great statesmen in America’s past. In opposition, Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt threw down the gauntlet: they posited to the American public that this was the chance to seize greatness – and if they failed, the Kaiser and his armies would be on our doorstep. As the Constitution demands, it was Congress – the elected representative of the people – that made the final decision.

The Philippine decision was, at its time, the most momentous choice in the history of America’s foreign policy. Yet America in 1898 was a second-rate power. America’s encounter with the world would undergo a sea change beginning in 1917, when it declared itself to be an Ally in the Great War, and 1945, when it took up Britain’s mantle as predominant world power, guarantor of balance and open trade, and ultimate shaper of global affairs. The decisions that allowed this shift to happen – the entrance into World War I, the American abstention from the League of Nations, and the declaration of war against the Axis Powers in 1941 – were made by Congress after serious and public debate.

The United States has fought several wars since the end of World War II. Congress has not declared war in a single one of them, despite the clear demand for such a declaration in the Constitution. Korea was a “police action”; Vietnam began only as a mission on the part of U.S. advisors to help the French recolonize Indochina; in 2003, Bush invaded Iraq after gaining authorization from Congress to act freely. Much of America’s postwar excursions are entirely unknown to the public. Few know about the U.S. sponsorship of the 1953 Iranian coup, the 1953 regime change that John Foster Dulles fomented in Guatemala because of the taxation of a U.S. fruit company, Reagan’s funding for both sides of the Iran-Iraq war, or Carter’s arming of the Taliban and Islamic extremists in Afghanistan, and countless other such semi-secret proxy wars and involvements.

In postwar America, decision-making takes place in a National Security apparatus that has been constructed entirely apart from democracy. FDR’s “brain trust” gave way to the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, who answer neither to the people nor to the elected, constitutionally delineated institutions responsible for foreign affairs. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger made decisions in a completely clandestine manner; only a small handful in the executive branch knew that he and Nixon were planning to completely overturn the United States’ policy towards China. Ronald Reagan, when permitting the sale of arms to Iran, concealed the relevant documents from Congress and from four of the eight members of the National Security Council. Indeed, the unelected Oliver North was running foreign affairs more than Reagan. In the Executive Office Building, North and the National Security Council effectively constructed a parallel undemocratic government with its own appropriations, Lieutenant Colonel, and intelligence capacities. That the Obama administration, according to leaked intelligence, has supported the ouster of legitimate democratic regimes in both Paraguay and Honduras remains entirely out of the national conversation.

Some centralization is inevitable in a nation of growing population and power. A healthy level of executive entitlement is a must for a country that wishes to have a cogent operation in the international sphere. But the democratic voice was always assumed to have a place; indeed, the Enlightenment vision of a Republic was centered upon a virtuous and self-determining people. Those providential ideals with which the United States was crafted have suffered an apostasy under the national security state. They are now little more than talking points with which Presidential candidates and press secretaries woo the public. The values that we pretend to have can only return with the reintroduction of transparency and responsibility.

If NATO Cannot Be A Lion, It Must Be A Fox

ALFIE SHAW

Imagine that you are Vladimir Putin. In February 2014, you were met with a weak international response to your annexation of Crimea. That year, your military’s largest exercise involved 150,000 personnel and took place on your western border; by contrast, the largest NATO exercise involved only 16,000 troops drawn from 15 allies. In an October 2014 speech on the theme, “The World Order: New Rules or a Game Without Rules?”, you declared your distaste for NATO, which you see as a “new effort to fragment the world, [and] draw new dividing lines.” You hope to draw your own lines representing your view of Russia’s place in the world. Imagine that you look to ill-defended Latvia, only 150 kilometres from St. Petersburg; why do you decide not to invade when you so easily could? 

Certainly not because you see NATO as a viable deterrent. Rather, because a simple cost-benefit analysis showed you that it was simply not worth it. NATO strategy must be radically altered in order to reflect this observation. 

Russia could not defeat NATO in a total war scenario but could achieve victory before a total war began. There can be no distinction between total war, where all of the resources of the state are dedicated to achieving complete victory, and nuclear war. Russia is capable of achieving limited victory against a NATO ally before the alliance can mobilise its conventional resources. Once limited victory has been achieved, all Russia need do is threaten a nuclear escalation in the event of a NATO response. The question then becomes, “is Latvia worth New York”, leading reasonable domestic political concerns to stall the Alliance’s military response. Delays such as this would allow Russia to seize the strategic initiative, making any future conventional attempt to liberate the occupied nation more difficult. It is clear, then, that given the indivisibility of nuclear and total war, NATO does not pose a significant deterrent to Russia.

Failure to respond to an invocation of Article 5 would secure NATO’s downfall. Since the Alliance exists primarily to provide collective defence, its credibility would be irreparably undermined if it failed to do so even once. A quick limited victory followed by a threatened nuclear escalation could, therefore, lead not only to conquest, but to the collapse of NATO in its current form. 

Why, then, does Russia not invade one of its weak Baltic neighbours?  The answer is that, in contrast with western media conflation of the apparent irrationality of Putin with that of Russia as a whole, Russia is a rational actor for whom the costs of an invasion significantly outweigh the benefits. The direct cost of an invasion would be small, especially if hybrid tactics were used to weaken the adversary before conventional forces were deployed. The indirect costs are far more considerable. 

Were Russia to cause Article 5 to be invoked by invading a NATO ally, it would become a pariah state. There is already little doubt in diplomatic circles that Russia is an illegitimate actor on the international stage: in 2014, the European Court of Human Rights delivered 129 judgments against Russia and the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ordered Russia to pay $50 billion to the former shareholders of the oil company Yukos, which was illegally bankrupted by the state. Most notably, of course, the world awaits the publication of the Dutch Safety Board’s investigation into the MH17 crash. The cost to the Russian economy of withdrawal from the international stage would be immense. Clearly, then, Russia would derive little benefit from a Baltic invasion, even without the direct cost of an occupation.

Successful annexation cannot come simply from defeating an army or by deterring NATO. In order to be successfully annexed, a nation must be occupied and stabilized. As NATO so painfully learnt in Afghanistan, an occupation perceived to be illegitimate is enormously costly to maintain and unlikely to succeed. There is no doubt that a Russian occupying army would be obstructed and that the capital of the invaded nation would be damaged during the invasion phase. This increases the cost and decreases the benefit, respectively, of the annexation of a NATO ally by Russia. 

NATO cannot legitimately decrease the benefit to Russia of annexing an ally, but it can increase the cost. As I have shown above, the doctrine of tripwire defence, whereby NATO stations troops in its threatened allies, cannot increase this cost given the potential for nuclear escalation. At current levels of defence spending, NATO cannot be a lion; it must be a fox. 

Rather than meeting asymmetry by preparing to fight a new, symmetric, Cold War, NATO should prepare to fight against Russia’s weaknesses, which are the same as its own.  Rather than attempting to improve its conventional capabilities without increasing defence spending, a futile pursuit, NATO should invest in preparation for asymmetric defensive warfare in its threatened allies. Following the Swiss model of national defence, NATO must encourage the introduction of national service in its threatened allies. 

National service achieves two aims: firstly, it provides a larger regular and reserve army than would otherwise exist. Equally important, when the threat of hybrid tactics is real, it provides a common experience that strengthens the sense of national identity within a state, reducing the potential for extraneous forces to sow division. On NATO’s most vulnerable border, the Baltic, Estonia and Lithuania both operate systems of national service, though Latvia does not. 

The real value of national service is not in the overt preparation for conventional operations that it makes, but in the potential for that army to employ asymmetric tactics. Even with a conscript army, any of the Baltic states would crumble in the face of the might of the Russian army; once that army entered the occupation phase, however, the conscript army could wreak havoc, hugely increasing the cost of an invasion, and so making one less likely. 

In the Swiss model, all fighting age males and female volunteers capable of military service receive 18 weeks of mandatory training followed by seven three-week recalls over the following ten years. There is, therefore, a large citizens’ militia to complement the small full-time military. They retain their personal weapon after their initial mandatory training, and ammunition is stored centrally at canton level. In the event of an invasion, and with the benefit of training and equipment, this citizens’ militia would not only increase the cost of occupation, prevent stabilization and so reduce the likelihood of successful assimilation, but would reduce the likelihood of an invasion happening at all. 

The alliance must play by the new rules recently established by Putin. In the event of an invocation of article 5, NATO must involve itself in the process of resistance. In order to ensure its survival, it must demonstrate that it is fully committed to collective defence. As I have shown above, however, it cannot do this overtly for fear of nuclear escalation. It must publicly increase special operations training in order to demonstrate that it can deploy the capability to support and supply resistance against an invader, fulfilling its commitment to collective defence while reducing the likelihood of a confrontation. NATO cannot deter by playing the lion, but it can deter by playing the fox. 

Image: British soldiers take part in NATO exercise Saber Strike in Latvia, June 2015. Source: NATO.