A year of progress: Afghanistan and Pakistan tackle the Taliban together

Hubert Cruz

At the start of 2015, the hopes of ending Taliban violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan were dim. Thirteen years after the overthrow of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan is still haunted by the insurgency, with almost 3,700 civilian deaths recorded in the previous year. Similarly, in Pakistan, the Peshawar school attack in 2014 left the entire nation in shock. 

The deep levels of mistrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan has often made mutual cooperation to neutralise the Taliban threat seem like a distant hope. Since the Taliban’s inception in 1994, the Pakistani army had provided substantial military and financial assistance to support its operations in Afghanistan and played a critical role in ousting the Afghan civilian government in the late 1990s. Although Pakistan claimed to have ceased supporting the group after the September 11 attacks, it remains a widely held belief that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), a major intelligence agency of the Pakistani government, continues to shelter Taliban militants in major cities, such as Quetta and Karachi, and maintain ties with senior members of the group.

Nevertheless, in recent years, Pakistan has also suffered from the rise of the new insurgent group friendly to the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP is based along the Afghan-Pakistani border, particularly the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. The TTP attack on the Peshawar school seemed to mark an end to the Pakistani government's distinction of “good” and “bad” Taliban - the former referring to those attacking Afghanistan and the latter, those attacking Pakistan. Thus, the Pakistani government decided to round up Taliban and other insurgent groups in North Waziristan, who previously used the region as a base for strikes in Afghanistan - a significant departure from Pakistan's traditional policy.

The Afghan government has also taken active steps to patch up its relation with Pakistan. Since taking office in September 2014, President Ashraf Ghani has broken away from former President Hamid Karzai's antagonistic attitude to Pakistan. In an attempt to ease Pakistan’s apprehension of Afghanistan’s pro-India tendency, Ghani refused India’s offer to supply weaponry to Afghanistan. In addition, Ghani deployed forces to fight the TTP alongside Pakistan. Ghani’s gambit soon paid dividends as the Pakistani government was able to persuade the Taliban to take part in negotiations with the Afghan government, signifying a major breakthrough in the peace process. 

Such gestures offer glimmers of hope of eventual peace in the region. Nevertheless, factors remain that threaten the fragile and nascent peace process. For one, Ghani has faced internal criticism for cooperation with Pakistan. Suffering of Afghan citizens at the hands of Pakistani-supported Taliban forces has led to resentment towards Pakistan. With pressure from many sides, it is conceivable that Ghani might choose to abandon peace talks with Pakistan out of political expediency.

On the other side of the table, the Taliban is also divided over the peace talks. During negotiations in Murree, Pakistan, some Taliban officials claimed that those attending only represent the factions close to the ISI, not the entirety of the group. A day before the second round of negotiations, the death of the Taliban's founding leader, Mullah Omar struck the heart of the group with strife and chaos. High-ranking members accused the elected replacement, Mullah Mansour, for being responsible for the death of Omar and a subsequent cover-up. In December 2015, the Afghan government claimed that Mansour was seriously injured in a gun fight with other Taliban fighters, and later died of his injuries. The Taliban deny such claims and the disagreement threatens to end peace talks. 

On the eve of the new year, the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan will certainly have more reasons to be hopeful for lasting peace than twelve months ago. Nevertheless, the journey that lies ahead in 2016 will undoubtedly be tumultuous and fraught with complications. 

India and Pakistan: From Bad to Worse

Saim Saeed

The South Asian press these days is dominated by good news about the India-Pakistan relationship. Geeta, as the local press calls her, is a deaf and mute Indian woman who spent the last decade stranded across the border in neighboring Pakistan. Recently, she was repatriated from Karachi, Pakistan, to New Delhi, where she was received by the Indian foreign minister Sushma Swaraj herself. “I thank the government of Pakistan from my heart,” she said. Geeta’s story gained attention because it resembled the plot of a Bollywood summer hit, Bajrangi Bhaijaan, in which the lead, an Indian man, tries to reunite a mute Pakistani girl stranded in India with her family back in Pakistan.

Amid the celebration and self-congratulation, one can almost forget just how terrible relations between the two nuclear powers actually are. It is an unfortunate fact that only the handshakes between heads of state, the exchange of sweets at the border, and stories like Geeta’s actually end up making the news. The status quo – constantly being on the brink of war – seems to merit less attention internationally and at home. Since India’s independence and violent partition in 1947, which carved out India and Pakistan as two different polities, the two countries have fought multiple wars with each other and countless skirmishes. Such conflicts tend to emerge over the disputed region of Kashmir, which both countries claim as a part of their territory. This is to say that at no point have relations between the two countries actively been ‘good’, but in recent years they have become even worse.

‘Epicentre of Terrorism’

In Pakistan, the military plays a dominant role in politics and it insists on portraying India as the enemy, partly as a justification for its inflated operational budget. Even token measures by the civilians to better relations with India – a process they call ‘normalisation’ – are rejected. For years, Pakistan has tried to ratify an agreement that would grant India ‘most favoured nation’ status, allowing for more goods to be traded. In a bid to make it sound less threatening, they renamed it ‘Non-discriminatory Market Access’, but that still did not help. Under pressure from the military, the Pakistani ambassador to India backtracked on the proposal and scuttled the agreement.

In 1999, there was a historic meeting between then (and current) Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif and Indian prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in Lahore, Pakistan, which claimed to herald a new era of friendly relations. Unknown to both Sharif and Vajpayee at the time, former Pakistani army chief Pervez Musharraf had launched a covert operation in Kashmir near the town of Kargil, cutting off Indian access to roads and communication. What followed was an intense battle with thousands of casualties and the threat of nuclear war. For good reason, then, India is sceptical of Pakistan’s commitment to normalisation.

India also argues that it has found very little evidence of Pakistan’s commitment to combat terrorism, which, it argues, is a prerequisite for dialogue. Hafiz Saeed is the leader of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, a militant organisation that frequently targets India, most notably during the attacks in Mumbai in 2008 which killed 166 people. Saeed walks freely in Lahore under government protection despite a $10 million bounty on his head. Another militant, Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi, known as the ‘mastermind’ of the Mumbai attacks, oscillates between detention and probation as a lackadaisical prosecution dithers over his case. Meanwhile, suspected cross-border attacks in India continue, including an attack in July this year on a police station that killed 10 people in Indian Punjab, close to the border with Pakistan. The former Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh called Pakistan the ‘epicentre of terrorism’ at the UN General Assembly in 2013, and from India’s perspective, it is still true today.

India’s ‘Muscular’ Foreign Policy

Pakistan’s troubles with militancy are not new, and it argues that a negotiated political solution to end tensions is only possible if both countries continue to engage in discussions. Under India’s new prime minister Narendra Modi, that has never seemed less likely. During his time in the opposition, Modi accused India’s former Congress-led government of being ‘soft’ on terror and on Pakistan, and promised a ‘muscular’ foreign policy once in government. He has delivered. Since his ascension to power a year ago, cross-border skirmishes have increased, and so have the number of casualties on both sides, forcing villagers to evacuate from their homes. For Modi, peace with Pakistan is not a priority. Even token gestures like the annual sideline meetings between Indian and Pakistani leaders at the UN General Assembly did not take place this time despite Pakistan’s eagerness. The Indian government also cancelled high level talks scheduled for this August, accusing the Pakistani government of meeting Kashmiri leaders, a traditional practice that had never precluded talks before.

Modi’s own foreign policy aims to elevate India to a higher global status. He has reached out to affluent Indian diaspora communities all over the world, including Silicon Valley, in an effort to attract talent and capital back to India. He has prioritised military and economic competition with China, multilateral trade with Southeast Asian economies, not unlike the United States’ Trans-Pacific Partnership agreements, and greater investment in defence expenditure and military technology. In essence, having seen the costs India has incurred by being bogged down by regional politics, Modi aims to transcend the region itself.

But two factors prevent him doing so. First, and due to his deliberate inattention, regional security has deteriorated. Since December 2014, when the Taliban attacked on a school in Peshawar that killed 150 people, mostly children, Pakistan has been able to mobilise both public opinion and its military against terrorism. The fallout from the military operation currently going on in Pakistan’s tribal areas is yet to be fully understood, but both India and Pakistan, as demonstrated time and again, are vulnerable to further attack. The potential disintegration of the border ceasefire may escalate, and with such trigger-happy militaries straddling the border, calm, effective leadership is essential. Token gestures like announcing a $10 million reward via Twitter to the Pakistani foundation that housed Geeta (they subsequently refused to accept) is not sufficient. War, never far away in South Asia, may actually be a product of his negligence.

Second, communal tensions between India’s Hindu and Muslim communities have risen under Modi’s leadership. These tensions risk both its relations with Pakistan as well as India’s standing abroad. As the leader of a right-wing Hindu nationalist party, Modi’s record as a custodian of Indian secular values is poor. It was under his watch as chief minister of Gujarat in 2002 that communal riots killed more than a thousand people, mostly Muslims. Although the courts absolved him of any crimes, he has refused to take any responsibility for the violence. As prime minister, Modi oversaw a beef ban in the populous state of Maharashtra, which has a sizeable Muslim community. It is a contentious issue, since cows are sacred in Hinduism, but their slaughter serves religious purpose in Islam. In recent months, Muslims have been lynched by Hindu mobs for allegedly keeping beef in their homes. Since Pakistan was founded as an answer to the perceived persecution of India’s Muslims, both its leaders and citizens would be far less eager to engage with a government that treats Muslims badly (Pakistan’s own atrocious record of protecting its Hindu citizens notwithstanding). Alleged crackdowns on the media, writers, publishers and comedians have also raised concerns over free speech. Reports of human rights abuses against marginalised castes and activists in Kashmir and the northeast are also ever-present. Touted as ‘the largest democracy in the world’, that moniker looks increasingly tenuous.

Not Just a ‘Sibling Rivalry’

All of this is to say that the India-Pakistan relationship matters, and leaders of both countries have clearly not done enough to salvage it to prevent an escalation of conflict, if not anything else. At present, neither side seems interested in doing that. Because bad relations have always been the status quo, citizens and politicians of India and Pakistan – as well as the international community – has always just accepted it. Some observers also believe that since both have the nuclear bomb, they will not fight a war because of the deterrent. The problem is that has proven to be empirically untrue. The Kargil war took place after both countries conducted nuclear tests, and was close to becoming nuclear. Given the stakes, the blasé attitude that South Asian politicians and the international community has towards India-Pakistan is criminally negligent. Belittling the conflict by calling it a ‘sibling rivalry’ is not just condescending, it also obfuscates the gravity of the security threat faced by the billion and a half people who inhabit the Subcontinent. Those people deserve greater efforts to live free from the fear of nuclear war.