The Curious Case of the Umbrella Revolution

HUBERT CRUZ

Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution was a strange display of people power. The 79-day resistance started with a series of student strikes in protest of Beijing's decision to, in practice, pre-screen candidates running for Hong Kong’s first direct Chief Executive Election. The student movement quickly expanded beyond police control after they fired tear gas against unarmed protestors, and triggered the dispersed protestors to occupy various parts of Hong Kong.

An unprecedented level of international media gathered in Hong Kong to cover the resistance, and called it the “Umbrella Revolution” after protestors used umbrellas to defend themselves against pepper spray. Many observers likened the Umbrella Revolution to Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement earlier in March, where students occupied the legislature and successfully forced the government to halt further trade liberalisation with China.

Nevertheless, in less than three months, the momentum of the Umbrella Revolution all but dissipated. Protestors retreated from their barricades without a single concession from the government beyond vague promises to discuss the matter. Chun-Ying Leung, the unpopular Chief Executive who approved the use of tear gas, has remained in office, and waves of arrests took place after the Umbrella Revolution ended.

While Taiwan’s students could resist Chinese encroachment, Hong Kong has been unable to sustain long-term protests in support of democracy. The failure of the Umbrella Revolution reveals a deeper contradiction in the minds of the Hong Kong people – as much as they wish for democratisation, they accept that Beijing has a say in the matter.

The root of such conflicting sentiments can be traced back to the Tiananmen Movement more than two decades ago. In the late 1980s, Hong Kong was set to return from British colonial rule to the hands of China within a decade. Despite many people started emigrating overseas in fear of Communist rule, leaders of pro-democratic parties continued to place high hopes in the reform and opening up of China, and believed political reforms would take place soon after economic liberalisation.  There was broad consensus among the leaders that Hong Kong should strive for a “democratic handover”.

In April 1989, thousands of students gathered in Tiananmen Square of Beijing to demand the Communist government to address corruption and implement democratic reforms. The Movement inspired the hopes of many Hong Kong people that China will become democratic and approve of Hong Kong’s democratisation after the Handover. The enthusiasm surrounding the Movement in Hong Kong quickly turned into disillusionment after the massacre.

The massacre, and the response to it, exemplifies the conflicted identity of the Hong Kong people. On the one hand, Hong Kong people no longer hold any hopes of a democratic Chinese government; on the other, their earnest involvement in the Movement has innately connected Hong Kong’s democratisation to the eventual democratisation of the Mainland.

In spite of their objections to Beijing’s conduct, Hong Kong people’s emotional attachment to the mainland led them to never question the legitimacy of the Handover which they never consented to, and often succumb to Beijing’s influence in Hong Kong politics. The legitimacy of the Basic Law, a mini-constitution that was not ratified by the people, was taken for granted. Beijing’s imposition of political authority over the rulings of the Hong Kong’s judiciary was protested, but eventually acknowledged by courts. While mass political protests and parliamentary objections have scuttled larger policy changes, they have been less effective in resisting more subtle erosion of Hong Kong’s authority—and they have yet to have any effect on the timetable for universal suffrage.

As leaders of pro-democratic parties position themselves as loyal opposition against a ruthless regime instead of a vanguard party mobilising the oppressed people for broad revolutionary struggle; it is not surprising that even supposedly radical protestors initially conceived the Umbrella Revolution as an occupation movement with “Love and Peace”. The ultimate objective was not to undermine Beijing’s dominance in Hong Kong, but hopefully to bargain for some political concessions. Benny Tai, the proposer of the movement, advised protestors to tie their hands to show that they have no intention to usurp political authorities, and left the occupation after the government offered to send a report detailing the events that happened in the movement to Beijing.

Counter-intuitive moves by leaders of the movement included showing an openness to negotiation by removing barricades. Most leaders quit the occupation by November as they disagreed with the student’s insistence for solid reforms. As the leaders chose to take a backseat instead of staying in the frontlines, the support for the Umbrella Revolution inevitably dwindled and ultimate failure was foreseeable since the students were not able to sustain the movement on their own.

The conflicting identity of Hong Kong people not only serves to explain the unwillingness of the movement to challenge Beijing authority through the Umbrella Revolution, but also highlights the unviability of such a weak stance in defending local interest as tensions between Hong Kong and China intensify over recent years.

Since 2003, Hong Kong has witnessed a massive surge of mainland tourists under the Individual Visit Scheme, where the Chinese government allowed citizens from major cities to travel to Hong Kong on individual basis, instead of through group tours or business visas. Many mainlanders took advantage of the scheme to crash the hospitals of Hong Kong in order to let their new-borns gain the right of abode. Others flocked to scoop up items ranging from powdered milk and diapers for babies to golden bracelets and residential flats for speculation.

The small capacity of Hong Kong was soon overwhelmed by an annual influx of 40 million mainland tourists. As the Hong Kong people struggled to cope with rising prices and shortages of goods blamed on excess demand from China, the unruly behaviours of mainland tourists further fuelled the tensions between Hong Kong and China.

Despite the locals’ intensifying grievances, the Hong Kong government has only taken marginal action to resolve them, and even then only reluctantly. In line with their long-held belief that Hong Kong’s future is inseparable from China’s, leaders of the pro-democratic parties have done little to halt Beijing from tightening its grip over the lives of the Hong Kong people, rather they perceived any political actions against mainland tourists as discriminatory, and called for the people “tolerate” uncivilised behaviour of tourists.

The inability of the leaders to transform the Umbrella Revolution into a struggle against Chinese domination stands in stark contrast with the successful Sunflower Movement in Taiwan. The Movement’s opposition to trade liberalisation with the mainland received territory-wide support as citizens united to defend Taiwan’s identity against Chinese capital and political takeover.  The murky position of Hong Kong’s movement in terms of local and mainland interest not only failed to establish the authority of student leaders among protestors, but also missed the opportunity to launch a broader appeal by connecting with disgruntled citizens to strengthen the base of support and momentum of the movement.

Fortunately, the Hong Kong people are starting to realise that tying their fates with China will only sink any hopes of them standing on their own feet. Many newly formed political groups call for the outright rejection of Beijing’s authority and campaign for the Hong Kong people’s self-determination. They have also taken the resistance to various retail hotspots to challenge the mainlanders who are overrunning Hong Kong, and put political pressure on the government to address the pressing interests of the local people.

Many commentators called the Umbrella Revolution a civic awakening of the Hong Kong people. While the people of Hong Kong step up their struggle for democracy, they also need to realise they are facing the domineering and intractable Beijing government. It is in remembrance of the spirit of the Tiananmen Movement that avoiding direct confrontation against Beijing’s hegemony is destined to fail.

Lubricating the Global Economy: The Impact of Collapsing Oil Prices

Jessica Rush

Arguably the biggest economic story this year  has been the fall in oil prices across the world. This one event has had an incalculable number of knock-on effects, illustrating just what an interconnected world we live in. This article briefly touches on the impact it has had in four different countries: Saudi Arabia, Russia, the USA and the UK. While the economic effect on each country requires in-depth analysis to fully appreciate its scope, this article argues that the prima facie diversity of consequence on key global players goes a long way to demonstrating their economic differences.

In basic terms, global  oil prices have fallen because supply has outstripped demand. The US has experience a boom in shale oil, due to an increase in hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling activity in Texas and North Dakota. This means that Americans are importing far less oil from other countries, leaving a surplus in their would-be suppliers.   Although in many other markets, powerful players will artificially reduce supply to prevent price deflation, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has made a deliberate decision not to do so.   Furthermore, the oil-rich countries of Iraq and Libya have not suffered the fall in oil production the market expected when they became conflict zones, and their output still continues. It is the combination of these factors that has led to a dramatic fall in price across international borders.

Saudia Arabia seems  to be at the epicentre of this  economic earthquake. An important member of OPEC, being the largest producer at around a third of the organisation’s total production, its opposition to a co-ordinated cut in the production of oil was decisive, despite  calls for such a move from Venezuela and Iran. It appears that the country was reluctant to risk losing its market share to non-OPEC suppliers, as happened when production was cut in the 1980s in response to a drop in demand, for which the country suffered financially. While Saudi Arabia will likely take a financial hit, the country has enough wealth to ‘wait it out’. This appears to be a calculated move, accepting losses in the short term in order to maintain market dominance in the long term. The very recent death of King Abdullah has prompted questions that a regime change might also trigger a turn-around in policy. However, reports have indicated the long standing oil minister Ali al-Naimi would continue in his current position. For the moment, at least, it appears the House of Saud is willing to endure temporary financial setbacks to ensure its country's long term future in the industry

These shifting economic  plates have destabilised an already fragile Russia. In Time’s nomination for person of the year, it was asserted that Putin was enjoying a jingoism-driven popularity surge reminiscent of that which followed his invasion of Chechnya in response to Russia’s involvement in Ukraine. This may well be short lived as the country enters recession. The BBC estimated in January that for every dollar the oil price falls  Russia loses two billion dollars  in revenue. Like its Gulf State competitor, Russia has refused to reduce production for fear of losing its market share, yet it is in a far more precarious financial position than the wealthy Saudis. Coupled with the sanctions facing the country from western powers in retaliation for its intervention in Ukraine, the fall in oil prices is doing significant damage to the Russian economy. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev has publicly admitted that the situation is difficult and that Russia will have to abandon some projects and programmes. Certainly, the country has seen a significant rise in interest rates, which is potentially bad news for  Russian businesses. The full impact of its financial constraints remains to be seen and western nations have indicated that sanctions are unlikely to be lifted in the absence of a substantial change in eastern Ukraine. 

Across the Pacific Ocean, it appears the fall in oil price is leading the USA into fertile economic ground. In January it was reported that US oil production was at a 30 year high. The fall in prices has directly affected the American consumer, the dollar-per-gallon price plummeting in a way not seen in countries that maintain a more artificial price. To some degree, there is arguably a general feeling that decreased imports of oil are releasing the US from dependence on the Middle-Eastern states of which it has traditionally been wary  That said it isn’t all good news for America. This drop in profits, as a result of the plummeting oli price, has coincided with the biggest strike in oil refineries since the 1980s, putting a fair amount of pressure on the boards America's oil companies, as the unions negotiate three-year employment contracts. More local impacts can be seen as well. In 2013, the National Geographic ran an in-depth article on the effect of companies moving to take advantage of the North Dakota's oil fields. Quiet, rural communities have strained under the weight of a large influx of new workers and significant environmental damage. The rest of the country may benefit, but the areas where the Shale boom is originating are reeling from the intrusion on a personal level.

The shockwaves can be felt here in the UK too with George Osborne proclaiming that the inflation rate is the lowest seen in modern times, there is certainly something to be said for lower oil prices (and its repercussions for travel, household energy bills and grocery shopping), giving UK consumers an extra boost as we slowly emerge from a period of economic hardship. However, the fall of prices at the petrol pump  just isn’t at the same level here as it is  in the US. Many travel and utility companies are locked into  contracts to buy at a certain price for a fixed period of time, so it will take a while for the cheaper wholesale prices to filter through. In turn, this depends on the prices staying low, which at the time of writing seems unlikely in the long term. The advantage of this is that there is little risk of major deflation that would do significant damage to the economy. A downward spiral of prices can stall an economy as consumers wait to buy and investors hold back, which was a major issue for Japan (for whom the falling oil prices present a major economic danger that must be managed). At the same time, the UK’s North Sea oil companies will struggle to make a profit at  current prices., Although certain areas such as Aberdeen, “the Oil Capital of Europe”, have been adversely effected, the UK as a whole does not have as large a portion of the economy relying on the oil market, so the lack of profits and investment is unlikely to seriously damage  our economy. However, for this reason the UK does not have the leverage to manipulate the market.  We cannot match the might of OPEC, and this jeopardises hundreds of thousands of jobs in particular in many northern communities if the domestic industry cannot stay afloat.

The four countries have showcased four very different relationships to this economic phenomenon. A close look at this shift in the business world illustrates two things.  The first is the depth and complexity of our world’s economic connections. There is not a global player that has been unaffected by this. Secondly, we can see the differences in individual economies. They may be interdependent, but they are not identical. The rumbles of an earthquake may be absorbed by a robust economy like Saudi Arabia, rattling the reserves but not the foundations.  Yet it can topple a shaky superpower like Russia. Western countries like the UK and USA may be able to take advantage of a shift in the markets without being destabilised, but we must be wary lest the ground move under our feet. Commentators have suggested this event is nearing its end, the oil price gradually returning to its previous level through a cyclical process. But there are no guarantees. The oil which transports us, warms us, feeds us and moves our economies has also exposed a diverse and complex economic world. 

Papua New Guinea: Balancing Beijing’s Economy and Washington’s Security

Willem van den Berg

When most Westerners think of Papua New Guinea (PNG) what comes to mind is often a combination of exotic photos from National Geographic, passages from Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel, and something resembling the image Boris Johnson created when he likened the Tory party to “Papua New Guinea-style orgies of cannibalism and chief-killing.” Not many see this Pacific island nation playing a role in the machinations of the great powers. However, that is exactly what PNG has done throughout the 20th century and is increasingly doing again in the twenty-first.

During the twentieth century the island of New Guinea saw wars involving Australia, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, and the United States, including significant campaigns by the Allies against the Japanese during the Second World War. Independence in 1975 led to a period of little foreign interest in the now sovereign state of Papua New Guinea; in the twenty-first century, it seems that the great powers are again turning their eyes to this Pacific island. Despite only having a population of seven million and a slightly smaller territory than Spain, PNG is home to some of the world’s most valuable natural resources. This year the Economist predicts PNG to have the world’s fastest growing economy.

PNG, like most Pacific island nations, has traditionally had a much closer relationship with Australia and the US than with China. Australia is the region’s largest bilateral trading partner as well as the largest aid donor. Australia and the US spend vastly more on defense cooperation in the region than any other nation and the US continues to be the leading military power in the Pacific, with military bases stationed throughout the Pacific islands and an unparalleled navy at standby. However, as China’s economic rise continues unabated and the world edges away from unipolarity, PNG’s close relationship with the West will come under increasing strain.

China’s rising interest in PNG is motivated by the island’s vast supplies of raw materials and mineral products, including natural gas, copper, and gold. Chinese trade with PNG increased more than tenfold between 2001 and 2011 to more than US$1.2 billion, and it continues to rise each year. A prominent example of China’s economic involvement in PNG is the Ramu Nickel Project, a US$1.4 billion investment by China’s Metallurgical Group Corporation, which was begun in 2008 and is expected to produce 31,000 tons of nickel and 3,200 tons of cobalt per year for the coming forty years. Thousands of Chinese now work in PNG, primarily in resource extracting industries. In addition, China has ramped up its foreign aid to PNG and since 2008 has begun giving military training and assistance to the PNG Defense Force, traditionally only given by Australia, the US, and New Zeeland. In 2013 China offered the PNG Defense Force a US$2 million grant, and PNG is preparing to open a second diplomatic mission in China—which is significant, since PNG has fewer than twenty diplomatic missions around the entire world.

Western states have not been blind to these developments. In 2011, then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that “We are in a competition with China. Take Papua New Guinea - huge energy find. Exxon Mobil is producing it. China is in there every day in every way trying to figure out how it's going to come in behind us, come in under us.” Though Clinton later downplayed these comments, they are emblematic of what many in Washington see as a zero-sum game between the US and China in the region. China’s involvement in PNG security matters has particularly raised alarm bells: both Australia and the US quickly promised increased levels of military training and naval support for the country.

Chinese investment in PNG has not been particularly smooth. Chinese companies have been accused of discriminating against Papua New Guineans by illegally bringing in thousands of Chinese workers, engaging in large scale corruption, and destroying the environment. Anti-Chinese sentiment is widespread throughout the country, erupting in numerous anti-Chinese riots over the past decade. In one such riot in 2009, sparked by a fight at a Ramu Nickel refinery, tens of thousands of rioters burned Chinese stores to the ground in several of the major cities and four Chinese were stabbed to death.

PNG’s government has a very amicable relationship with China though. Former Prime Minister Michael Somare encouraged Chinese companies to invest in PNG and welcomed military cooperation between the two countries. As a result, during anti-Chinese riots text messages circulated among the rioters declaring “The Somare regime existed through Asian mafia’s funding.”  Current Prime Minister Peter O’Neill has taken a less overtly pro-China stance, inviting more Australian troops to the island and declaring that PNG’s vital strategic and security relationships remained with Australia and the United States, though the country would continue to develop closer economic ties to Asian countries.

The trends observable in PNG-Chinese relations are present throughout the Pacific island region. Trade and aid have dramatically increased over the past decade and Chinese diplomatic engagement is beginning to reflect that. Chinese officials are now warmly welcomed and China has begun to formalize its relationship to the region, for example by hosting the China-Pacific Island Countries Development Cooperation Forum, where China promised US$1 billion in loans and 2,000 student scholarships to the islands in the coming years. After the 2006 coup in Fiji the West reduced aid and imposed sanctions on the country, while China actually increased its aid in accordance with its policy of non-interference, providing more than half of all foreign aid to Fiji for several years. Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa stated “China is a better friend to Pacific Island countries than the United States.” PNG, along with several other Pacific island nations, are awakening to the prospect that their future may include a mismatch between their security ties to the US and their economic ties to China.

Rather than flashpoints like Taiwan and the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, it is in countries like PNG where China, underreported in the West, is successfully gaining geopolitical ground and starting to challenge American hegemony. China’s economic involvement in the region has ballooned, and it is being followed by diplomatic and military clout. Although PNG will remain in an American and Australian-dominated Pacific island security system for the foreseeable future, the gravitational pull of the Sino-sphere is steadily increasing. PNG is slowly being tugged out of its Western orbit and is increasingly experiencing the tension between Washington’s powerful security ties and Beijing’s lucrative economic ties.

The Enemy of My Enemy

WILLIAM YELDHAM

On November 6, 2014, the Reuters news agency reported an astonishing story. In October 2014, President Obama sent a secret letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stressing that the two countries have a shared interest in fighting Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria. With Republican barks of 'Nuclear Iran' filling the senate and congress, this letter to a member of Bush's hyperbolic 'Axis of Evil,' has its roots in the Syrian Conflict.

The Syrian conflict is no longer a political struggle contained within the boundaries of one state, but a regional sectarian war. The refugee crisis that has followed in the wake of the conflict is not only straining the infrastructure and resources of neighbouring countries such as Jordan, but also, exacerbating existing tensions in host communities. There is on-going fighting between the Shia Alawite-led army of Assad, supported by the Lebanese paramilitary group Hezbollah, and the broad spectrum of Sunni opposition, increasingly dominated by Islamist groups. The result is a territorial map that looks like a Jackson Pollock. However, on a broader geopolitical level the possible emergence of the 'Shia Crescent' has hardened hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Iran. King Abdullah and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's infamous friendly hug just in 2007 now seems long ago.

But how has the shifting agency of global powers US and Russia affected this? Despite the favourable election of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the U.S. has traditionally supported Saudi Arabia over Iran due to its long-standing alliance with Syria. However, the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) and its rapid, albeit erratic expansion has put the US between a rock and a hard place. Its options are limited: to continually oppose a potentially nuclear Iran or risk the territorial expansion of the ISIS.

The humanitarian cost of the crisis thus far has been enormous. Approximately 3 million people have fled Syria since the start of the conflict, most of them women and children, and neighbouring countries have borne the brunt of the refugee crisis.  In December 2013, the UN launched its largest appeal for a single crisis asking for £4 billion. However, the geopolitical ramifications of the conflict have been crystallized respectively in the Iranian and Saudi Arabian regional security strategies.

The first of these international actors is Iran. The country has been in favour of a centralized security approach in the Gulf, in contrast to Saudi Arabia who looks to external actors, particularly the United States, to guarantee its national and regional security. This crossover in terms of national interest plunges the entire region into a power game. Moreover, Iranian financial support to Shiite groups in Arab countries has increased tensions with Saudi Arabia, which in retaliation has lent support to  Iranian ethnic minorities in a bid to destabilize the Iranian regime.

International intervention in the conflict has not been restricted to these regional powers, and the actions of the US and Russia, have transformed it in some measure, into a proxy war. Although Russia has actively promoted the opening of the second Geneva meeting in order to gain initiative on the Syrian issue; it has also started to establish a permanent fleet in the Mediterranean.  Furthermore Russia has also moved its Asia pacific fleet to waters in the environs of Syria. Respectively the US has taken active steps to prepare for war, deploying the “patriot” missile defense system in Turkey and Jordan, carrying out large-scale joint military drills at the border of Jordan and Syria and increasing military support to the Syrian opposition.

However, the threat of Russian influence in the region has been far outdone by the rise of the ISIS. With as many as 1000 groups controlling 100,000 fighters, the ISIS is a self-funding, rapidly spreading threat to security in the region. Islamists and Jihadists whose tactics have caused rebel in fighting in the past, and fragmented the opposition to the Assad regime, now outnumber secular moderates. The ISIS has now taken control of huge swathes of territory across Iraq and Syria in spite of the efforts of US-led coalition airstrike beginning in September 2014.  Iran is a key part of this coalition and as such the power dynamics within US- Iran negotiations over nuclear power have shifted immensely.

Mohammad Reza Naghdi, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), recently claimed that the “Americans are begging us for a deal on the negotiation table.” Indeed, such confidence is widespread within Iran and without. Saeed Ghasseminejad, an Iranian dissident and associate fellow at the Foundation for Defence of Democracies, stated

“Iran feels the administration needs the deal, and this belief is supported by the way the administration is acting.... Iran feels as long as the negotiation is going on, it has a green light to do whatever it wants in the region, so why should they bother to sign a deal?”

Yet, the truth is not quite as simple as this. Negotiations are still hampered by strong resistance to any compromise in both countries. Republican Senator Mark Kirk recently argued that “The Iranian terror state continues to show its true nature as it sidesteps the international sanctions regime during negotiations, and expands its threat into Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.” The deputy head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Hossein Salami, was also reported by the state-controlled Fars New Agency (FNA) as having stated that the country now has forces in Iraq, Syria and Yemen that are 10 times larger than that of Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The fear of neighbouring countries and Iran sceptics is that increased US-Iran relations will lead to a unipolar region as the deal they close will allow Iran to keep large amounts of its centrifuges running. Indeed, the Obama administration recently denied a report that said the President would agree to 80 percent of Iran’s demands in the ongoing nuclear talks. In light of Salami’s threats, the country that has most to lose by this is Israel. Israeli officials believe the deal would render Iran with the capability to reach nuclear “breakout capacity” almost imminently thus placing Israel in a very dangerous geopolitical and security position.

Will it last?

Despite the presence of the ISIS as a shared enemy, American and Iranian interests in Iraq are likely to diverge. The US, at least in principle, wants to see an inclusive democracy take root in Iraq, while Iran is focused on protecting Iraq’s Shia majority and religious shrines in a bid to bolster its position vis-a-vis the Saudis and other western-backed Sunni monarchies of the Gulf. Toby Dodge, an Iraq expert at LSE recently questioned the durability of such an alliance in his comments -  “The Americans may think they have a coalescence of interests with Tehran, but that is a false hope. Iran’s policy has always been to sectarianize the conflict and back Shia chauvinism. That is the exact opposite of the outcome the Americans want – citizenship and equality for all before the Iraqi state.”

Problems in the US Coalition against ISIS?

Although the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Bahrain joined the coalition at the very outset, most observers believe their participation was more symbolic than active. Iraq has no air force to speak of and its army turned tail against forces of the ISIS; the Saudis allotted a trifling number of planes to the effort; while Bahrain doesn’t have an air force at all. The UAE has the biggest and most modern air force in the Gulf region and its suspension of bombings in early December was a major blow to Washington’s war effort. On Wednesday, 4th February 2015, US officials admitted that the UAE had suspended its air attacks in early December, directly after a Jordanian F-16 fighter aircraft was downed over the Syrian headquarters of the ISIS in Raqqa and its pilot Lt. Muath al-Kasasbeh was taken prisoner. However, hopes for the unity of the coalition were rekindled on the 7th of February, when Jordan’s Interior Minister Hussein al-Majali, said that Jordan will go after the ISIS and will “wipe them out completely.” Meanwhile there have been reports that UAE is sending F-16 fighter aircrafts to Jordan to aid the airstrikes. Rather than crippling the coalition as was initially feared, the capture and tragic death of Muath al-Kasasbeh has strengthened the resolve of the coalition. This was further evidenced by the march in Amman on the 6th of February in which protestors chanted “We are all Mouath…we are all Jordan,” as well as “Death to Daesh” – an derogatory Arabic acronym for the terror group. This bolstering of the coalition has for the moment somewhat curtailed Iran's bargaining power although it still remains an essential ally for the US if the latter wishes to maintain its chances of containing the threat of the ISIS.

What the Future holds?

Covert Alliance: Open disagreement

Despite the increasing involvement of Iran in the struggle against the ISIS, the Iranian denial that its planes had conducted air raids is categorical. A senior official similarly rebutted any suggestion that it is co-operating with the US in Iraq. “Iran has never been involved in any air strikes against Daesh (ISIS) targets in Iraq. Any co-operation in such strikes with America is also out of the question for Iran.” When recently asked in an interview on whether the United States would consider cooperating militarily with Iran, US Secretary of State John Kerry coyly replied, “Let’s see what Iran might or might not be willing to do before we start making any pronouncements.”

The alliance between the United States and Iran is essential in order to effectively restrict the expansion of the ISIS, however it could also potentially destabilize the region even further in the long term.  Only time will tell how well this affair of convenience will last.

Facing IS: At Best Buying Time?

KHALIL OSMAN

“Despite talk of military action, there was one thing we all agreed on: terrorism is resolved through politics and economics not through arms and intelligence, however important a role these play.” Those are the recollections of Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former Director-General of MI5, of the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. These thoughts are perhaps worth considering now more than ever. Firstly, consider arms and intelligence, and the important role that these play. Military action against the self-proclaimed ‘Islamic State’, (they are ironically neither Islamic, nor a state), has so far proved successful in preventing their advances. US air strikes to assist the Peshmerga were pivotal in preventing IS from taking Erbil, as strikes to assist the Iraqi government were in preventing IS from seizing key Iraqi dams.

That said, at the time of publishing, reports are emerging from Syrian Kurds that air strikes are not actually working. One should take note of the mission creep that is now occurring, with US airstrikes being employed far beyond the scope of the initial objectives stated by President Obama on August 8. Those were specifically to help the fleeing Yazidis, and to protect the Kurdish people and US personnel in Erbil. Proponents would argue that nevertheless, the strikes to date have helped to contain the advance of IS. They have indeed played an important role. However, the idea that this makes them successful is a dangerously narrow way to judge success. In reality, there are a number of significant risks that arise from such strikes, even if they have physically restricted the advance of IS.

Terrorism is resolved through Politics and Economics

Let’s start with the blindingly obvious. Recent history has shown us that even the most advanced weapons technology does not eliminate collateral damage. In a 2013 report entitled “Will I Be Next?”, Amnesty International cites sources claiming that the US launched 330 to 374 drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and September 2013. It says that according to these same sources, between 400 and 900 civilians were killed in these strikes, and at least 600 people were seriously injured. Human Rights Watch released a similar report, noting the civilian casualties arising from drone strikes in Yemen. Beyond the intrinsic harm of such damage, and that cannot be overstated, such casualties are instrumentally counterproductive to the pursuit of the objectives that are used to justify the strikes in the first place. In Pakistan, they have alienated local communities, fostered hatred, and ultimately act as a recruitment tool for the very groups that the strikes claim to target. Similarly, such casualties would foster the same resentment in Iraq, and act as a recruitment tool for IS. Reports have already suggested that IS fighters have moved themselves and their military assets into built up areas, surrounding themselves with the civilian population. We risk feeding into IS’s wider narrative. In the Commons debate on the issue last week, George Galloway warned against Britain and its allies “returning to the scene of their former crimes”.

Whatever one thinks of the rest of his speech, and indeed his wider views, this is undeniably a sentiment that is felt across the region. The Arabs are not unaware of their history. The state of Iraq was only demarcated by the League of Nations in 1920, before being placed under British mandatory control. The Arabs that fought an insurgency against the Ottomans during the First World War were encouraged to do so by the British, and were promised an independent state, free of British interference in return. They were, of course, betrayed, with the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement between the British and the French defining the division of the region between the two powers after the war. The post-war order in the Middle East, the nation states that exist, and the power blocs that have since controlled them, can be traced back to the heavy influence of the then colonial powers. Also note the proliferation of Al- Qaeda in Iraq that occurred precisely because of the 2003 invasion. Bombing Iraq again risks making Britain less safe (again). What about the presence of the Gulf states and the Iraqi government in the coalition? Iraqis know that the Gulf states are closely allied to the West, and this further feeds into the IS narrative of overhauling the existing order. As for the Iraqi government, it is unrealistic to expect Iraqi Sunnis to immediately support it after years of marginalisation at its hands. This will take time, and ultimately, it requires politics, the only real solution. That is not to mention the Syrian, Turkish and Iranian dilemmas. Syria has not been included, Turkey is wary of arming the Kurds, and Iran has refused to militarily cooperate. A failure to tackle these dilemmas may present insurmountable challenges to the success of any military action.

ACUTE HISTORICAL AMNESIA

Nevertheless, bombing will inevitably continue and escalate, now with UK involvement. But despite what the likes of Senator John McCain will have you believe, the idea that military action will actually defeat IS and solve this problem is pure fantasy. It represents the short-term horizon, acute historical amnesia and complete lack of understanding of the complexities of Middle Eastern politics that have crept into foreign policy. If military action now plays out as planned, and that is a big if, it will only weaken IS for a period of time, and not defeat them. In addition, bombing risks making the problem even worse. Our leaders realise that something needs to be done, but in the absence of a coherent strategy, have reverted to bombing. Our armed forces are being asked to do something that is perhaps counterproductive, presumably to make us feel better. There are, of course, other ways to combat IS. Former British military officer Frank Ledwidge notes that “Nothing would better fit their [IS’s] agenda of recruiting Sunni sentiment and active support than to have western bombers overhead and Shia soldiers in front of them.” He instead suggests “intelligent, effective covert action, and I have no doubt this has begun.” In effect, he proposes UK military action, but not bombing. Ledwidge wants Britain to be involved militarily, but only in a covert manner, thus not feeding into the IS narrative. Perhaps this is wiser, but again, it can only buy time.

BEYOND ARMS AND INTELLIGENCE

It is this said period of time that must be used wisely. In order to truly challenge IS, we must move beyond a reactive, knee-jerk foreign policy that consists overwhelmingly in arms and intelligence, and develop a longer-term view to engage in the political and economic spheres that Baroness Manningham-Buller speaks of. The common denominator of the states where such fundamentalism truly takes hold is poor governance and a broken state and/or society. Indeed, IS were given the opportunity to take hold in Iraq by the incompetence, corruption and sectarianism of Prime Minister Maliki and his government.

So what is the truly effective solution in states such as Iraq? As John Simpson puts it: “It may not be easy, but it is abundantly clear… The only serious answer is to turn them back into real countries once again.” He suggests pressure for good government, carefully targeted aid, counter-terrorism assistance, and military training. This is indeed something that the UK can influence. In 2012, Britain reportedly gave £86.8 million to Somalia, and £200 million to Afghanistan, ranked first and third in Transparency International’s list of the most corrupt nations respectively, and both countries where fundamentalism has taken hold. In a similar spirit, the UK should use its influence to ensure that its considerably close allies in the Gulf clamp down on the private individuals that are funding groups like IS. These are but a few tangible policies that the UK can pursue to take on IS. More specifically to Iraq, a political alternative has to be provided to the areas where IS has taken hold. This involves stopping the marginalisation of the Sunnis that occurred under Maliki. The idea of local Sunni units to police Sunni areas, and Shia units to police Shia areas, all part of a unified national guard, has been tabled. Perhaps that may be a start. More fundamentally, Iraq needs more federalism. It is through such a system that sectarian and tribal grievances can be properly addressed, and the wealth of the nation can be shared. It provides a channel through which local issues can be managed and controlled.

IS must be defeated by intelligent, effective, covert action

Ultimately, one must ask the question of what drives people into such violence. Political institutions that can deal with the root issues will prevent marginalised citizens being attracted to, and forced into violence. Such an approach involves long-term engagement and commitment in Iraq and elsewhere, and that is how we must really do battle. Whether we like it or not, military action will, at the very best, only buy time. More realistically, it may lead to dire consequences, and simply add fuel to the fire. The key is politics to challenge the root causes. There is no doubt that the phenomenon that IS represents must be tackled, and Britain can play a role. But if there is one thing that we can be certain of, one thing that history has repeatedly taught us, it is that the nuanced challenges posed by the Middle East cannot be solved militarily. It is worth summoning Albert Einstein’s definition of insanity: “doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results.” Westminster, take heed.